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INTRODUCTION
The 16th day of July 1936 was the last day, Spain
was to have of peace - if peace be called the state of
tempestuous hysteria of the five months that preceded the final
eruption of the volcano. In fact the domestic history of Spain
during the six and a half years that elapsed between the fall
of the dictatorship and the outbreak of war in Spain displays
a rhythmic movement of long chaos followed by brief periods
of comparative order, i^t the violence that broke down on the
fateful 17th July was not to terminate till Spain had had its
full thirty one months civil war and the world its record of
one of the most inglorious chapters of its history. The war
that was fought between the brothers of the same blood
(reinforced by foreign corpuscles of all shades and colour )
was both bitter and cruel. In the ordinary sense, all wars
are cruel. But the poignancy of the Spanish Civil War and
the heartburning it caused, can scarcely be paralleled
anywhere else. The number of dead and wounded left on the
field is hardly the right index by which to judge the
intensity of feelings of the warring camps. Even then the
n
figure of one million dead or wounded should be ebough to
impress that derftagogi« scholar who is used to derive his
conclusions strictly with the help of a slide rule and graph
paper.
But the most unique feature of this civil war - and
civil war it was - was the interest it created in the countries
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of the world. Interest, perhaps, is hardly the appropriate
word, for the fierce passions and the intense loyalty that it
evoked, created such a world wide debate that people ran at
each other's neck when arguments failed to settle the issue -
not always a wise recourse,- as readily on the roads of
Shanghai as on the boulevards of Paris.
"Right and Left (physically and politically
speaking)" says Salvador De Madariaga in the preface to his
book SPAIN, the people "fell victims to the fascination, the
passion, the abhorrence or the enthusiasm of this or that
extreme. A, who in 1931, as .an old and staunch Monarchist
had been perturbed at the fall of the Crown, burned with holy
C 0mmunist Zeal in 1936; P, an old Republican, ever in an
uncomprising opposition under the Monarchy, an opposition to
which he had sacrificed his military profession, was in 1936
a convinced 'Nationalist' or Francoist out of his deep
disappointment with the mistakes of the Republic. Information
was confused, biased both ways, hardly ever objective. Within
one hour and one hundred yards, one could hear in Paris the
effectives of the International Brigades put at 70,000 and at
5,000 by men who had both been present when the Brigades had
saved Madrid. Guernica was bombed by the Germans and burnt
by the Revolutionists in the columns of the same New York
„r
paper which one searched for objective news.
In other words, the heart had taken the complete
control over the head. But it were not only the people on
the road, or debating societies and clubs in schools, that
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caught the frenzy of the combatants of the Spanish War. Even
the governments of various countries started taking sides
III
openly, though, it was known, that they had been doing so,
covertly for a long time. The Spanish Civil War has been
described as an international war fought on the Spanish soil.
Various countries and governments have been accused of the
responsibility of plotting the war. It is not my purpose to
discuss these topics here. They will be discussed elsewhere
to show as to how much truth do these statements hold, but it
was not difficult even then to see powerful foreign interests
lurking behind the facade of civil war.
People, v/ith eyes, could see that the spark of a
world conflagration lay in the civil war that was being fought
in rhw Iberian peninsula, unless some common modus vivendi
could be found between the supporters of the two combatants.
It was this desire to localize the conflict which gave birth
to the policy of Non-Intervention. The framers of the policy
intended that no foreign element should be allowed to creep
bn this internal strife and the two parties should be let alone
to fight it to the finish. For it was realized that the
intervention of one country in favour of one of the combatants
would provoke the supporter of the second party in conflict to
enter the arena and would thus involve the participation of
foreign countries - which it was the very purpose of this
policy to avoid.
The study of this period of European diplomacy makes
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a most melancholy reading. On the one hand, were the
ineffective, weak, vaccilating^ democracies submitting docilely
to the tricks and threats of the totalitarian governments on
the other hand were the dictators completely bereft of any
sense of morality in public dealings and by alternating threats
with pious platitudes were bent upon going their own way. How
far did the policy of Non-Intervention succeed in its purpose
is still a mute point. While its admirers maintain that in
spite of its drawbacks and shortcomings, it did succeed in
preventing the conflict to spread beyond the borders of
Spain, the critics retort that the World War II would never
have occurred but for the shameful surrender of the democracies
in this so-called Non-Intervention Committee, where, in the
happy phrase of Senor Azana, the only effective non-
intervention applied to Spain was the non-intervention of the
league of Hat ions.
The main purpose of this wopk is to analyse the
policy of non-intervention, follow its course from the time
of its birth ( though its parentage is a matter of controversy)
to the time of its inglorious death, when even its one-time
most vociferous, champions were conspicuous by their absense,
and had neither the time, hardly any desire, to give it a
decent burial, as Mr. Hitler was calling their attention
elsewhere to more urgent problems.
“Thus ended an international experiment which had
followed a very different course from that intended by its
promoters at the time of its genesis, and for which the
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highest claim that could be made by its warmest suoporters was
that it had succeeded in confirming the conflict within the
frontiers of Spain; but this at the expense of the legally
elected government of that country and possibly also (as critics
pei«t of French and British official policy were not slow to p
point out) at a high strategic cost to France and Great Britain
themselves.”*
But for a clear grasp of the genesis of this
policy, it is essential to understand the desires and claims,
the motives and the polucy, of the various interested groups.
In view of this, it has been considered preferable to give
first a chapter describing the Internal conditions of Spain,
followed by another whish records the motives and interests of
*1
the various European countries. This, it is believed, will
facilitate the exposition of the problem as much as it would
clarify the basic issues at stake. After that follovrs the
main body of the thesis, though the first two chapters are
as much a part of the thesis as any other, and then follow the
conclusions etc.
Hari P. Sharma
*Prof. Arnold J. Toynbee in SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
1938, Vol. I, p. 341.
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( CHAPTER ONE )
The Internal Conditions Of Spain
The Spain of 1936 was a Spain where the 17th, 18th
and 19th centuries had still not run their courses. In
certain ways, the Spain of the 20th century was not very
different from the pre- Renaissance Spain. All these types
of Spain could be seen marching together on the roads of
Barcelona as in the villages of the interior. In fact, the
full impact of Renaissance was never felt in Spain - this in
spite of the fact that an overwhelming majority of Spaniards
professed a religion which was likewise professed by large
sections of some of the most advanced nations of the modern
Western World. The truth as Prof. Toynbee says;
M seems to be that the community of life and
outlook that went with thid8 common Catholicism
did not go very deep. The Catholicism of the
Trans-Pyrend^p countries of Europe was a
Catholicism which had taken the lesson of the
Reformation to heart and had put tts salutory
experience into practice, first in the Counter
Reformation and thereafter in the Catholic social
activities which had played so prominent and so
admirable a part in the lives of the industrial
populations of Belgium and the Rhineland and
Westphalia during the last half century." 1
On the other hand, the forces that had evoked these
activities in the Trans-Pyrenaen Catholic world had hardly
impinged upon Spain. Except for the small fringes of her
Basque and Catalonian regions, the rest of Spain never
underwent the industrial and technical revolutions that the
other nations of the West had done. Spain never opened her
1. ( Survey of International Affairs, 1937, Vol.2.Page 3 )
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windows to the fresh gusts of new ideas - and the result is
the state of anaechronism in which it finds herself today.
This has been responsible for creating that state
of tension and rift with which the entire peninsular air is
surcharged today. Quoting Prof. Toynbee again:
11 But it is one of the tragic ironies of the Spanish
people’s modern history, that their apparently
strong desire in these latter days to make their
country into something like a "hermit kingdom" -
at least in certain departments of its life - was
condemned a priori to frustration by a geo-
graphical situation which was as unchangeable as
the leopard’s spots or the Ethiopian’s skin." 1.
The dogmatic ideas of the 17th century church find
themselves today face to face with the scepticism and
relativity of the modern science. And it does not need to be
mentioned that the enforced company of such strange bed-
fellows is hardly wholesome to either. The old pedigreed
land-holders blink at the "preposterous" and "unholy" ideas
of socialism and Anarch-Syndicalism and it is hard for them
to believe that the pleasant days of Don Quixote have ended,
^hey cannot understand the hustle and bustle of the
industrial era. Bull-fighting is still the ’ace’ game with
them. F 0r them, the French Revolution has still not taken
place;^Bastille still stands for them. But the world history
hardly can ever afford to wait for anybody. The impact of
events in quick succession has bewildered these gallant
knights of the 17th century who have never come out of their
massive stone forts and no wonder they are surprised to find
1. (Sur. of Int. Aff.1957, V0l.l,Page 127 )
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that people no longer prefer castles and forts for living,
and that it is the era of sky- scrappers.
This great difference and opposition of ideas
accounts for the violent antagonism that separates different
sections of the people. The entire struggle and conflict of
Spain during the past half-century can be summed up as the
'effort of a nation to bridge the gulf from the 17th and 18th
to the twentieth century.
This gulf was in evidence everywhere and the
economy of the country was still geared to the ox-plough.
t
Exploitation, sanchioned and approved by religion was rampant.
The existence of a vast Agricultural population which the
governing classes had proved unable to save from misery was
perhaps the most serious evil in Spanish life. It was an
economic evil, for it is evident that the wealth of the country
would benefit by a more adequate relationship between the
land and its tillers and that, through land reform, Spain
would, certainly, succeed in raising her food pruduction. It
was a social and political evil owing to the social ferments
which it developed in the mass of agricultural labourers.
Ill-fed, ill-clothed, lacking in instruction, with no stake in
the land, the best of them combed out by emigration, the
agricultural labourers, of Andalusia in particular, were a
-w>\
ready growed for all the forms of violent propaganda. It is
worth noting that Spain is the only modern country where the
philosophies of violence and anarchy, of KropatKin and
f
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Bakhunin have a recognized place in the politics of the
country. Poverty always provides a congenial soil for dis-
contentment and violence. The poverty is so crushing that
almoot more than 91$ of the landowners earn less than the
average urban industrial worker. Spain'/s crying need today
is the amelioration of her vast peasantry.
Above and beyond this is the fact that Britain,
France, Belgium, Germany, the United States, Switzerland and
Italy have invaded her with Capital and experts and while they
have up to a point contributed to Spain* s development., they
have on the whole, as might be expected, rather prevented
than fostered, the growth of her industries to the limit which
the country’s possibilities warranted. Spain i3 the only
exception in the Western world with regard to economic
sovereignity. 50$ of the pyrit^es of the world comes out of
Spain, but the British Capitalists who control the mines have
seen to fee it that practically none of the industries which
might be founded on this untold wealth flourish on Spanish
s'o
soil# The potash deports of the Catalan Pyrenees are rich
and vast, but the European Capitalists who control this
uajvtsecl
.
market have se4n to it that they remain s ter ile-. The country
with the richest Copper deposits in Europe must buy its
copper from England, the country which produces the iron ore
of Bilba# pays for iron utensils five times what they cost
in Portugal.
The other great problem of Spain is her religion.
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It Is really more than a problem. The country Is profoundly
religious with a religion of its own which for all practical
purposes coincides with Catholicism. But the people are
profoundly opposed to Clericalism. They are not militant
anti-clericals, because as Salvador De Madaraga put it
militant anti-clericalism is a political attitude and the
Spanish people are apolitical"; - but the potential antag-
onism which underlies their attitude towards clerical matters
is definite and precise. In 1909, the populace of Barcelona
let loose years of accumulated anti-clerical passion. The
result was terrible.
The Church has always applauded measures of
coercive character with regard to the free expression of
opinion and bn all its activities there is tendency to
militancy, an aggressive attitude and a self assertion which
are as unchristian as uncooperative. The fact is that
clericalism is a growth of the Catholic religion, even though
a diseased growth, and this makes its abolition so difficult.
It is hard to attack Clericalism without infuriating the
Catholic institutions. Again, the strength of the Spanish
Clericals is but the weakness of the Spanish Anti-clerical,
for in the immense majority of cases, the anti-clerical
brings forward "no substitute for the religion which he would
displace." The Catholic religion has now been for twenty
centuries perh^p s the central element in Spanish culture
and civilization and though fallen on evil days.
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6" mostly under the action of historical causes
which have influenced to an equal extent other
forms of national life, though fallen even for
ever from ifcs predominant position in Spanish
life, it still is and must remain for a long
time to come, one of the chief features of the
spirit of Spain The believer, whether a
clerical or only an anti-clerical, stands
therefore on stronger historical ground than
the new-comer whose ideas are more often than
not a ’heady’ acquisition without roots even
in his own soul. It is useless to offer the
Spaniard that rationalism which, in the form of
intelligent doubt, is such a "soft-cushion
for the well-made head" of the Frenchman," 1*
To such a type religion is a necessity even if it be no more
DtiU
than the passive attitude of the stoic,
Ganivet, writing in 1896, humorously suggested that
-fr "vec
if a few thinkers and Protestants could be hired to live
in Spain, matters might be improved. As late as 1923, a
leading Spaniard expert calculated that 50$ of the juvenile
population of Spain was not being educated at all; 25$ was ed-
ucated by the State, and 25$ by the Church, The number of
State teachers hardly exceeded that of priests and nuns en-
gaged in education and the amount of money at the disposal
of the Church was about equal to that spent by the State,
The immense social power which the Church unquestionably
posses in Spain and which could be utilized for the regeneratio
of the nation has been undeniably used for the purpose of
opposing the invasion of Spain by the modern Western spirit,
DeMadariaga sums it up:
"it would be difficult to find a country in which
the Clericalism is more rigidly i^mical to all
reasonable compromise with the Zeitgeist than
contemporary Spain." 2.
1. (Salvador De Madariaga’s Spain, Page 128)
2, ( Spain; Page 126)
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The other great factor in the arena of Spanish
political life is the Army. But it would be erroneous to
imagine the Spanish army as a huge military machine power-
fully organized to obtain the highest possible fighting
efficiency out of the large portion of the Budget which it
consumes. The Army is a bureaucratic machine which spends
most of the money paid to it in salaries for generals and
officers, a lesser amount in war-material and a still lesser
sum in preparing for war. The Army in fact, is more im-
portant as an instrument of home politics than as a weapon
of war.
The post of Secretary and Under-Secretary for
war became military sinecures, not to be entrusted to any
civilian. Control its military expenditure disappeared
altogether in actual practice. The Army and its administrat-
ion became a state rathe-r the State. Two consequences
followed. This huge adminis tration, free from all Treasury
control becamse as cumbrous as inefficient. It developed a
disproportionate head, while it starved its body, so that
there were, in 1927, 19906 officers (including 219 generals)
for 207,000 troops, while the habit of sending a considerable
number of the men back home instead of keeping them in actual
service made this proportion of officers still higher. As it
is and even accepting these figures at their face value, the
was
proportion of officers to soldiers were about one in ten.
while in Prance it was just below one in twenty at the same
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8date. This abundantly shows that the adminstratione of the
Spanish Army was overburdened with a military bureaucracy
insufficiently occupied in professional activities precisely
because the object of its administration, defence was starved
in order to fatten the body of officers - for that is what in
reality stirred behind and usurped the name of the "Army" -
turned their attention to civilian affairs.
Thus, on the whole, it will be found that when
military politicians appear on the Spanish stage, the permanent
difficulties which beset political life are increased by their
rivalries and ambitions, though an outstanding personality with
sufficient power to oust all others sometimes succeeds in
establishing peace and order, that even then, though the country
is anle to benefit from a period of peace and prosperity, the
political education of the people suffers from the methods of
force adopted, and finally that a clerical reaction usually
setsAn, with disastrous effects in all walks of life and
a politics and education.
S For centuries, Spain has been under monarchy,
benevolent sometimes, despotic mostly. When Alfonso XII died
in 1902, in the prime of youth, the internal conditions
demanded some well seasoned, experienced head. But what Spain
got for her king was a lad of sixteen, who assumed the name of
) Alfonso XIII. The young king had a charming personality, was
ambitious and wanted to play his part fully. He was the heir
to a long tradition of absolute monarchs undiluted by half
way measures of constitutionalism. He himself wanted to be
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the "de facto" government of Spain. The king was a first-rate
politician, but not a statesman. So th^t while under his rule,
Spain progressed industrially and economically, the seeds of
dissension were, withal, sown too. "Power corrupts and absolute
power corrupts absolutely"- Lord Acton has said. And Spain under
Alfonso XIII was a classical example of it.
The liberal opposition, which had been kept under
suppression was slowly gathering weight. But, reaction set in
againjin 1923, when General Primo de Rivera proclaimed himself
dictator with the tacit apprc^.1 of the king. For seven years
the ambitious dictator ruled the country, till he had to flee
to Paris in 1930. After I930yit is recent history. A short
period of intrigues and counter-intrigues was followed by the
birth of the Republic in April 1931.
The king in exile, since then has never stopped
intriguing against the Republie. In fact, Monarchists have been
OLt)
one of the most prominent supporters of the Right. It is^open
secret that agents of the exiled king had always been in contact
with Mussolini and Hitler. And General Franco’s coup was
planted with the full approval and support of the Monarchists.
The Monarchy has sometimes been blamed for all the ills of the
country. But the truth is that the Spanish people hape never
exhibited any capacity for the successful working of constitutional
democracy. Parliamentary government has never found the Spanish
climate conducive to its growth. And so Spain has continued
up till now, as in the past centuries
,
to be ruled under
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inefficient bureaucracy. Spain would have continued to live in
her own fashion, had the outside world only left her alone. But
her natural strategic advantages are such that, if string, she
must play a first-rank role in the world; and if weak, she must
be the constant object of close attention on the part of the
strong. But, for the last three centuries, Spain's power is
continuously on the decline. And as a consequence, the foreign
powers have beem closely interested in her destiny. The only
point oflher sovereign territory that is under foreign possession
I
is the rock fort of Gibraltar. But it is a paradox that amongst
all the nations of Europe, Spain is the nation most interested
in preservation of the naval supremacy of Great Britain for a
long time to come. The Spaniard is in this case very much like t©
that ruined gentleman who on no account would part with an old
steward of his, not particularly honest. "Not for any love that
I may feel for you," said the poor man, "but because I fear that
your successor will leaae me a beggar."
Ganlvet wrote in I896
,
" Gibraltar is a permanent offence which we in part deserve
for our lack of good ef government; but it does not hinder
the normal development of our nation and is not a
sufficient cause for us to sacrifice other more valuable
interests in order to anticipate a fact which must come
about as the restoration of ©He our nationality evolves
towards its logical conclusion. It seens absurd at first
that our interests should be linked up with those of the
only nation towards whom we have motives of real resentment
but in recognizing and accepting such absurdities lies at
times the deepest wisdom."*
^Madariaga, op. cit., p.214
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CHAPTER TWO
THE CIVIL WAR BREAKS OUT
The Civil war that flared up in Spain in July 1936,
was but the culmination of a long series of events. The
country was then throbbing with disorder. All the years of
pent up hate were rushing to explosive outlet. The six years
of the life of Republic were uneasy years full of disorder and
political assasination from the very beginning. The psychol-
logical conditions in which the Republic was born might have
made some such moderation possible on the part of the leaders
of the Republic. But though the Republic might have been
moderate, it simply was not. The impetus of eight years of
bottled up energy and the pressure of eight years of political
dreaming were too much for the men in charge of the ship of
the State and they steered her full steam ahead aginst the
immutable rocks of Spanish obduracy. The farseeing sensible
men in the assembly had been unable to restrain the doctrin-
aires and the demogogues who were determined to put all their
wares in the window from the first day of the fair. The
discontent with Church, Monarchy and feudalism that had been
smouldering so long burst in 1931 when the new Republic was
proclaimed.
Perhaps, it is unfair to indict the people for the
small disorder that followed. History is replete with such
examples, whenever the popular emotion has been suppressed
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too long, it bursts out with the proportionate fury some day.
In fact, on the whole, Spain took it with much order than some
other countries had done. But, still the spirit of petty,
almost vindictive vengeance could be seen there. In fact, the
conduct of Spaniards of all parties and walks in life during
these ominous years revealed the same Spanish national
characteristics. The same phenomenon to look for trouble, to
neglect to open safety-valve^, to express grievances by re-
sorting to physical force and to retort to such outbreaks by
repression untempered with redress.
"instead of setting itself, in its first flush of
success, to solve the agrarian problem, the Re-
public settled down to the diversion of baiting
the Church; and this perversely had a multitude
of untoward consequences. The anti-clericalism
prompted a number of smaller pin-pricks, such as
the redognition of no form of marriage but civil
marriage. While a timorous Church was goaded into
hostility by wanton attacks that confirmed its
worst fears, a peasantry which had always been
prone to shed blood was exasperated by neglect
into resorting to its habitual remedy of taking
the law into its own hands. In the subsequent
reactionary chapter of the story, the Right
took their revenge by provocatively setting
themselves, to undo everything that the Left
had done. And all parties, in turn, at different
stages, resorted to the violence that was the
ultima ratio Hispanorum; as though they had
conspired to demonstrate that Spaniards had no
use, as well as no capacity, for the mainten-
ance of a Tpans-Pyrenaean bourgeois parlia-
mentary King's Peace." 1*
In this way, did the Republic pour its own youthful
energy into the task of strengthening its traditional enemy,
the Church, invigorating it by opposition. Another opponent
that the Republic created was the Army. The Army was, as has
1
. ( Prof. Toynbee in Sur. of Int, Affairs , 1937
,
Vol.II, Page 14 ).
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been mentioned before, a State within the State, rather touchy
and apt to be ill-tempered. Senor Azana, drastically cut the
number of officers and forced in other reforms. "Azana was
right in his aims," as Salvador de Madariaga says, "but was
not perhaps quite as right in his manner." The moral wounds
thus inflicted on the most pampered of Spanish services were
more deeply resented than the actual material loss. Some
officers retired; others found that time weighed heavily on
their hands and made use of the leisure paid them by the
Republic to conspire against it. Gradually the ranks of
disgruntled and discontented officers grew thicker and began
to move under the spirit of union for conspiracy which had
been developed in the Spanish Army throughout the 19th century,
more often than not at the instigation of impatient politi-
cians, now of the Right, now of the Left. This new enemy
that the Republic made, the one whose case was the least
justified of all, yet perhaps was the most dangerous.
What made the Spanish Civil War inevitable, is the
logical question that arises? Revolt of the Army, was not a
novel phenomenon in Spanish politics. So many had taken
place before and had been suppressed. Them, why did this
particular affair attain such an international importance?
Various reasons and explanations have been forwarded. One
school of opinion is that it was essentially on European war,
taftvt
though it was being fought out by faoe4: agreement between
the principal European belligerents and neutrals in a
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peninsular arena
"Nor could it even be said that these European comb-
atants on Spanish soil had merely seized upon and
converted to their own sinister purposes, an affray
that had started as a civil war between Spaniard
and Spaniard. For it would have been difficult
to point to an initial period, however brief during
which the war in Spain was a civil war pure and
simple." 1.
It would be interesting to compare it with another
school of thought whose conclusions are exactly the opposite
of what the above. The international importance, in the
opinion of the latter, which this war came to acquire and the
active intervention in it of two Fascist and one Communist
States have tended to obscure the fact that in its inception
and in its essence the Civil war was above all Spanish. The
foreign disputants are said to minimize or ignore the genuine
Spanish nature of the conflict and stress its international
aspect. De Madaraiga further says that
"neither Communism, Russian or otherwise, nor
Nazi-Fascisra .German or otherwise had the
slightest possibility of provoking a Spanish
C^vil war in 1936, even if they had tried,
which they did not. Such a power was exclusively
in the hands of the Army officers and the Union
workers.
"
Again,
" But it must be borne in mind that the Spanish
Civil war began purely as a Spanish affair,
grown out of the Spanish soil in the old
Spanish way. It was the outcome of the typical
combination of the two predominant political
passions of the Spaniards: dictatorship o£
separatism.
These, somewhat long quotations have been taken to
show as to how violently the opinions can differ regarding the
l.(Sur. of Int. Affairs. 1937, Vol.II, Page 126).
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Spanish war. Both the writers, whose opinions have been quoted
are astute students of politics and their opinions carry weight
which cannot he dismissed lightly. The truth seems to be some-
what between these two extremes. This conclusion should not
be taken to mean that the writer is trying to steer the
middle course and thus avoiding the risk of reputation from
both schools. For the middle course wherever else it might
be the safest, is not always the most preferable in political
study. That the truth approximates to neither extreme should
be evident by the logic of events, which will be shown
hereafter.
The elections that took place at the beginning of the
year 1936 were such that neither side, Right or Left expected
a victory at the polls in February. There is ample evidence
that all sectors of Spanish political life would have accepted
parliamentary defeat in a sporting spirit, neither the Left
Socialist nor the military would take a popular verdict unj^vovtra
-Scnrour
^y to them without violence and that therefore the next
election was bound one way or another, to lead the country to
a Civil wars The extreme Right and in particular the officers
were convinced that aplot against them was being brewed by the
Revolutionists and on both sides lists of names of the men
marked for assasinations supposed to come from the files of
the other side, were known to circulate.
The new Ministry which was formed in Madrid on the
19th February, 1936 was of a moderate complexion.
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Senor Azana was the Prime Minister; his Cabinet included no
Socialists; and the Ministry's first acts (e.g., towards
Catalonia^) were all conciliatory* This moderation, however,
was of little avail, since the parliamentary regime in Spain
was now a facade with no solid structure behind it. The forces
of violence were, all alike, out of hand, and the nominal
government were as impotent to curb the direct action of their
own political allies to the left of them as they were to re-
strain the militant champions of the Right from taking the law
into their own hands. Esther side sought to excuse its own
resort to violence by pleading an inalienable natural right of
self-defence; and on both sides this identical plea was
difficult to rebut, since it was impossible to' give any
assurance that either party would be able to protect itself
against the aggression of its opponents by any means short of
delivering its own blow first. There was no longer in Spain
any parliamentary forum from which the voice of reason could
carry, or any effective public peace. The only significant
chronicle of Spanish events during those comparatively, but
not yet superlatively, dreadful months between the holding of
elections and the outbreak of the war, would be a catalogue
of acts of violence.
How far had the connivance with the two Fascist
States gone? The answer is not easy. Here again, as on the
other side, a good deal of propaganda shrouds the real facts.
What exactly happened was that Hitler and Mussolini had been
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spreading their nets in Spain to suit their own ends of
military and economic espionage very much as every big Pcwer
does in a greater or lesser degree everywhere and at any rate
so far as Germany is concerned with tremendous power of
i
efficiency. To call the revolt ef a pure Fascist coup'd-etat
is oversimplifying the issue; though it must be conceded that
the Fascist countries had been in close touch with the "would-
be rebels considerable . time in advance and without their
assistance the revolt could never have expected to succeed.
5l»]ce
Yet the difference is significant y in as muoh ae that her e a
Spanish party interested in overthrowing the existing regime
was helped by Alien powers rather than that some "artificial 1 *
rebels had been planted by the Fascist countries. But let us
be clear about one point. It is all very good to proclaim the
virtues of charity and feel very pious after quoting it from
the religious tenets but it is as well to recognize that the
R£ug*ion
Ghur-eh and the chessboard of international politics are two
different things. And the intentions of the two Western
democracies were as much inspired by self-interest as the
actions of the dictators. That by helping General Franco to
win the war, they expected to gain definite advantages can
hardly be denied. But while recognizing this, the Spanish
element in the struggle should not be overlooked, for it was
a genuine factor from the beginning to the last.
The competition in violence culminated in two
sensational murders amd a military revolt. In Madrid, on the
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evening of the 12th July, Lt. Castillo, an officer of the corps
of Guardias de Asalto was shot dead and in the small hours of
the morning of the thirteenth Don Jose Calvo Sotelo, who was now
the leading politician of the Right was called up, arrested,
and carried off by a squad of police in a van. That afternoon
a body that had been deposited by some police in a mortuary
already in the small hours of the morning was identified as
being that of the arrested man. On the 17th July in the
Spanish zone of Morocco, the Spanish Army rose in revolt, and
within the next 48 hours there were parallel military risings
in garrison towns all over Spain.
This was " a revolution carefully planned and skil-
fully organized by able military leaders on a nation-wide
scale", as Peers says in his ’The Spanish Tragedy
', (p . 211)
.
There was ample evidence that it was not a spontaneous uprising
as the Rebels would have us believe. Prof. Toynbee sums it
up admirably:
" It is not credible that it could have been improvised
within four days as a reprisal for Senor Calvo Sotelo's
shocking death, though it is not impossible that the
date may have been slightly advanced with an eye to
taking advantage of the feeling aroused by this
particularly heinous crime of the Left against the
Right. Another explanation which was current on the
Nationalist side after the event was that the military
revolt was planned and executed in order to forestall
a projected "Red" revolution which was to have taken
place at the end of July or in August with Russian
support. The evidence which was forthcoming in
support of this particular allegation against the
Left fell far short of being convincing, and the
imputation has rather the air of being a covert
apologia. The action of General Franco and his
confederate is, however^ quite easy to explain in
•*
•
... ...
.
*
.
• '
*
-
...
'
,
.
.
•
.
r
.
B •
the Light of events up to date, without having re-
course to the hypothesis that the Left were known
to he meditating a crime that would have eclipsed
all their previous atrocities. Assuming, as we must,
that the preparations for the military revolt had
oocupied some weeks, or even months, before the
nationalists eventually took the field on the 17th
July, 1936, the situation almost on the morrow of
the general election of the preceding February was
already such as might have impelled the moving
spirits in the Spanish coups of officers to decide
,
in favour of taking up arms as soon as they could
complete the arrangements for a concerted general
military insurrection. A short experience of
post-election conditions might well bring the forces
of the Right to the conclusion that the civil
government had practically lost control and that the
only safety for the b&tes noires of an unbridled
Left in a homicidally maniacal frame of mind lay
in self help through the deployment of all the
physical force at their command. The military
conspirators, in particular, may have been moved,
in the end, to put their fortunes to the touch by
a knowledge that the Government had got wind of their
conspiracy and were intending to take drastic
disciplinary action." 1.
On July 11 - that is to say, two days before the
death of Senor Calvo Sotele - the British aviator Captain
Bebb, under special contract from a Franco agent in London,
flew from Croydon to Las Palmas to pick up the rebel leader.
And thi3 provides further conclusive proof that the violent
disappearance of the Fascist leader was not the cause of the
rebellion. Without the promise of help from Mussolini, Hitler
and Oliveira Salazar, F^anc© would never have started his
rebellion. But already before July 17th, 1936, there existed
pacts and agreements between the three powers mentioned and
the intending rebels which guaranteed to the Spanish generals
the certainty of foreign intervention against the Republican
1. ( Sur. of Int. Aff. 1937, Vol.II,Page 22)
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government of their country.
"Pertinax", the well-informed Diplomatic correspon-
dent of the Catholic Conservative "Echo-de-Paris , " who is
hardly a person to he suspected of sympathy towards the Left
popular movements of Spain, wrote the following in the August
number of the London "Fortnightly."
"It is too easily forgotten that on the 28th of July,
1936, four Caproni aeroplanes staffed with officers and
non-commissioned officers of the Italian army had the
bad luck to land or to be wrecked on the wrong side of
the border between Algeria and Spanish Morocco.
Mr. Peyrouton, the high commissioner in Rabat
,
personally
cross-examined those men whose names and military ranks
were indicated in papers found on the board. They all
declared that they had been recruited from various
units of the Italian air forces at the beginning of
July and had received their final instructions on the
15th, that i& three days before the outbreak of the
counter-revolution. As early as March or April in
the same year, the French Ambassador in Berlin had
informed his government that General Sanjurja, who
would have been the leader of the rebellion but for
the accident which cost him his life, had reported
himself there and had been welcomed in official
quarters .
"
x
"Hispanicus" writes in the collection of the
documents known as "Foreign Intervention In Spain " on Page X,
"Only fools or knaves, or foolish knaves - foi/even
these exist - could deny all the evidence ... .Until
the end of October, when Russia began to send war
material to the Spanish Government, the Spanish
people were fighting their foes under conditions of
terrible inferiority. In these months - from July
until the early days of November - the Spanish
Government was completely abandoned by the rest of
the world. True, in democratic countries there
were collections among the working class for the
Spanish Popular Front. And clothes and money were
sent to Spain. But these pious activities lacked
efficacity in comparison with the work of Italy,
Germany and P Grtugal who sent tanks, planes, rifles
and machine-guns. "I shall win, because I have
r. Foreign INTERVENTION IN SPfttN , HlSPftNlCOS - PeTse *
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*
better material than the "Red^" Prance declared to an
"Evening Standard" correspondent." 1.
From the very beginning, it was evident that the
dictators were bent upon going full steam ahead with their
programme of intervention. While the democracies were dis-
cussing, and rediscussing as to through what streets of Paris
and London demonstrators should parade, Berlin and Rome were
forging ahead by sending bombers and tanks. On September 30th,
1936,^ President of the Spanish Republic, S onor Aflana
,
gave an
interview to Vernon Bartlett, "News Chronicle" special
correspondent;
"Enthusiasm is good, but there are occasions when
heavy bombers are even better, * he said emphasizing
the growing disparity between the Loyal and Rebel
air forces owing £o the policy of non-intervention
which he condemned very bluntly.
The policy of "Non-Intervention", which became in
practice active and constant intervention of Italy, Germany
and Portugal in favour of Franco, and passive complicity on
the part of other countries against the legitimate Spanish
Government, is without precedent in history. The fact is that
the Spanish watf almost brought the final collapsd of inter-
national law. To this collapse England and France contributed
in no small measure. If these two Powers had maintained an
attitude of simple legality the Spanish war would not have
gone on for two years. Because had it not been for the help
given to Franc© by international Fascism the war would have
lasted only a few months and would unquestionably have ended
with victory for the Government. 0n October 10th, 1936, the
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F0r©ign Minister, S anor Alvarez del Vayo, declared to the
"Daily Telegraph" correspondent;
" The insurgents have obtained constant aid, while the
Government has met with all kinds of obstacles....
The rebellion would have been already practically
suppressed, with the exception, perhaps of Navarre,
which is the only region where the insurgents have
the support of large sectior)3 of the civil population,
but for the foreign aid given to the insurgents....
One week before the present Cabinet was formed, I
visited the Madrid aerodromes with Senor Caballero,
We had four planes for each insurgent ’plane. Today,
according to figures supplied by the Air Ministry,
the proportion is probably 20 insurgent planes for
each Government machine. More insurgent planes
have been brought down than Government machines,
and if they had not received foreign aircraft in
such quantities the enemy air force would not
exist now. The figure of 20 to one is alone a
mortal blow for fttnon- intervent ion accord. Nor is
there any sign of reduction in foreign aind for the
insurgents. It continues cynically and is encouraged
by the indifference* with which up to the present,
the Spanish Government's exposure of the infractions
of the non-intervention agreement have been received
in offical circles abroad." 1-
There could be legally no defence for the policy of
non-intervention and specially of the variety that the world
so
tragically came to know. According to the "Institute of
International Law."
" Every Power at Peace with an independent nation is
tound not to interfere with the measures which that
nation takes for the re-establishment of internal
peace. It is bound not to furnish to the insurgents
either arms, munitions, military goods or financial
aid."**
From the first moments the Governments of the demo-
cratic nations declared themselves neutral. Such noutra-Iirty
was
,
— On the other
hand the dictators said - France’s cause is our cause. The
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effete answers of the democratic countries to,. interveniu*jagainst
the legitimate Government was the policy of "Non-Intervention?
It has already been shown that the talk of a Soviet plot to
^vune.
implant Communism in Spain was prove reactionary propaganda.
Russia only decided to send war-material to Spain when she
saw only too plainly that "Non-Intervention" was an unjust
fSrce. On the subject of Russian intervention "Pertinax"
may be quoted again:
"It is absurd to assign to Soviet Russia a decisive
past in the sequence of events. During the whole
month of August, Stalin remained indifferent to the
fate of the Spanish Communists, outnumbered by
Anarchists, Trotskgists, Socialists and Syndicalists
of all descriptions. . .when he was stirred out of his
passivity.
.
.his motive was not so much to help in the
creation of a Soviet in Spain - he is intelligent
enough not to have dreamed of it - as to maintain
the Third International, the weapon he wants to have
in hand against Germany. .. .We have played to the
end with cheaters the game of non-intervention."' -
The entire course of this tragic policy, which
will be developed later, is replete with incident after in-
cident when the Republic in its utmost hour of gravity and
danger v/as left over to the wolves. But before pursuing the
genesis of this policy, it would be more logical to examine
the interests and motives of the various Powers interested
in Spain.
*
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CHAPTER THREE
INTERESTS AND MOTIVES OF P (WERS
The potential strategic importance of Spain and her
possessions cannot he over emphasized. And, specially so,
since the emergence of the Third Reich under Adolph Hitler,
when the s-frrugglo for "v/orld power-1'- began :
"the neutrality of Spain would in any case have been
in jeopardy - even if the Spaniards had not facili-
tated foreign intervention by falling out among
themselves, because of Spain’s geographical bearing
upon vital strategic interests of all the four
European Great Powers. The balance of power between
Italy and Great Britain might be turned this way or
that according to whether political control over
the Spanish coasts of the straits of Gibraltar was
in hands friendly to Great Britain or at any rate
neutral, or in hands friendly to Italy; and in the
same way the bias of the political control over the
.
Balearic Islands might exercise a decisive on-
fluence upon the balance of power between Italy
and France 11 • 1 •
But the strategic significance of Spain was not
confined to the Mediterranean only; for even greater issues
were involved in the Spanish strategic factor in the North
Atlantic. In 1936, the Spanish Empire still debouched upon
the western seaboard of the North Atlantic at four points.
It was evident that if Italy were to obtain even an indirect
control over some or all of these f«bur Spanish frontages on
It
the Atlantic, her ability to make herself a nuisance" to
France and Great Britain would be greatly increased. But
Germany’s interests were even more evident. German’s weak spot
vio - cr»vi-B her struggle for supremacy with Great Britain has
1. (Sur. of Int. Aff.,1937, Vol.II Page 129-30).
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been her weak navy, and no immediate factor could be counted
upon which would put the balance in her power. But if
Germany were to succeed in obtaining naval facilities on all
or some of these regions on the western shores of the North
Atlantic, she might be in a position, in case of a conflict
•cno
with the tw o West^-aemocracies
,
to interest the communications
between France and Great Britain on the one hand and the
French and British overseas empires on the other hand; and at
the same time she would be securing stepping stones for her
eventual re-entry into Africa. Above and beyond this," she
would gain the possibility of playing on France the trick of
'encirclement * which France might be held to have been playing
on Germany ever since the conclusion of the Franco-Russian
alliance of 1894."
Again -
tt
*
In 1936, indeed, Spain was mere the determining factor
in a European balance of power. In the event of war
between the 'democratic* and the 'Fascist' pair of
European Great Powers, there would be little prospect
of a decision on the continental front across which
these opponents would be facing one another between
the North Sea and the Atlantic. At a time when the
technical advantage of the defensive over the
offensive was considered by the experts to be in the
order of about three to one, nothing but a military
sta€em§S% was to be expected either on the Alpine
Sector between France and Italy or on the Rhenish
sector where the Maginot line had been matched, by a
German equivalent. A decision could therefore
hardly be achieved unless one of the two parties
could succeed in turning the other's flank; and
for this purpose a command of the Iberian
Peninsula would be of capital importance . If the
Western Powers commanded it they might hope to
succeed in establishing contact, via the Medit-
erranean, with the Soviet Union and any other
potential allies of theirs on the eastern flanks of
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’the Rome-Berlin Axis? On the other hand, if the Central
Powers commanded the 3i>erian Peninsula, they might not
only liberate themselves from the nightmare of a war
on two fronts, but might put their Western opponents
in this unpleasant quandary.” £•
Nor were the strictly strategic assets the only
Spanish factors that came into consideration. The economic
wealth of the peninsula, her influence on South America were
other factors which could not be easily lost sight of. But
time, during this period, was running out and the danger of a
world- conflagration was increasing. In the words of a letter
from Sa lvador de Madariaga published in The Times newspaper
of London on the 19th July 1937, and quoted on the same day
in the House of Commons at Westminster by the Unitod Kingdom
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr, Eden,
"By a tragic coincidence this war, essentially Spanish
has ’caught on’ abroad, lured by somewhat shallow
parallelisms, men, institutions and even Governments
outside Spain have been adding fu&L to the l&ve
which is consuming our unhappy country. Spain is
thus suffering vicariously the latent civil war
which Europe is - so far - keeping in check." 3 -
But the French people were still struggling to keep
out of the war, in spite of all provocations. In a speech
delivered at Sarlat on the 3rd August, 1936, Monsieur Delbos
declared in the name of the countrymen, that
"(As we do not want to risk war, on any pretext, we do
not want to meddle in the internal affairs of any
country that you may care to name. At no price must
there be a new crusade of ideals in Europe, for such
a crusade would inevitably have war for its outcome." 4 •
The condition in the ’totalitarian' countries, on
the other hand, was entirely different. The regimes were, by
1-
.
- ( Sur
,
—of Int. A-ff-7-1957 ,Vol Il-^Pagc 151) .
2, (Sur. of Int.Aff. 1937, V0l.II,Page 131).
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ndefinition intolerant of any ideologies that conflicted with
their own; and the expression in speech or in writing of any
ideas, differant from the existing were ipso facto " subversive"
" In each of these countries one voice only was
now heard because all other voices had been
either muffled in the concentration camp or e
smothered in the grave. There was no confusion
•, of counsels, because there was no debate. "1
The national of the totalitaridn states could
enjoy the exhileratlon of feeling that in serving his party
he was serving his country too. But these points of strength
in Soviet Union, Germany and Italy were unequally matched
in the Democracies by the corresponding points of weakness.
Democratic France and Great Britain, were-net by the very
definition of the term democracy, had to tolerate and
recognise the opposition. In fact, in Great Britain the
opposition was dignified by bearing the name of His Majesty's
Opposition. And if the Governments of France and Great Britain
had tried to silence the Opposition, they could not have
done so without violating the long cherished traditions, esf
«fl(He7T9oltvcs
and being guilty of being unconstitutional. None of the two A
facing them
,
could delight the^Governmentg . The unconstitutional
muzzling of the Opposition was out of the question and th-e
hence, the Govts, of France and Great Brit in had to choose
the other alternative of being handicapped by their Opposition
in every step of their foreign policy.
Besides, the Democracies had a moral aversion
to take any steps that shoulconvolve any palpable risk of
1. Toynbee, op. cit,
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war, howsoever remote. It was true that the totalitarian
countries were no less anxious to avoid wars, especially
with Powers of equal or superior strength. Still the fact
remains that they could sail much closer to the brink of
war than the Democracies could even think of. The 'piratical*
attacks of submarines on the ships of Soviet Union and
the Western Democracies exhibited clearer than ever that the
Fascist countries were W prepared to incur much greater
risks in carrying out their policies. France and Great Britain,
on the other hand,
"were not^only non- willing to use war themselves
as an indtrument og national policy ; they were
non-willing even to exercise their legitimate
rights^in the spheres of non-military action if
there was a risk that the exercise of them might
move other Powers to take illegitimate military
reprisals The three totalitarians Powers
were, indeed, assiduous in breaking their non-
- intervent ion engagements to the twpe two Democracies
up to he extreme limit of French and British
forbearance, andthe unwillingness of the two
vestern Powers to follow suit in this deplorable
game put them at a further disadvantage^, whieh
did them no dishonour. "1
After this, it might be convenient to discuss
the motives and interests of each Power, interested in the
affairs of Spain separately.
THE INTERESTS AND MOTIVES OF THE FRENCH
it- ,
Due to having a common land frontier with Spain, France
1. Toynbee, op. cit., p.138
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=
was the most directly affected by the conflagration in Spain.
In this international crisis. Monsieur Blum and his colleagues.
Communists
,
JJ*
in a recently inaugurated coalition government of Socialists^
and Socialist-Radicals found themselves in a peculiarly
difficult position. It was beyond question that according
to the currently accepted rules of international lav/, French
citizens and the French government themselves if they so
desired, were fully entitled to supply war-materials to the
Government at Madrid, who iij the eyes of the law, were a
legitimate government contending with an unlawful rebellion.
Moreover, in the parliamentary bloc on whose support
Monsieur Blum's government were directly dependent for their
e
existence, there was, no doubt a considerably majority in
favour of helping the Spanish Government, at any rate by all
lawful means; for this bloc included all the deputies and
senators belonging to the three parties - Socialist -
Radicals, Socialists and Communists - comprising the Popular
Front. The government was influenced
"in favour of overruling the French desire to exercise
the French right of selling arms to the Spanish
Government in order to make sure of fulfilling another
French desire which the exercise of this French right
might threaten to frustrate. This other desire was
a wish to keep France herself out of war here and
now; and in the pursuit of an aim which was common
to almost all Frenchmen at the time, the Socialist-
Radical Ministers were perhaps not so much distracted
as their Socialist colleagues may have been by an
'ideological' sympathy with the Popular Front in
Sgain." 1.
1. (Sur. of Int. Aff. 1937, Vol.II,Page 140)
: o . o : : ;jr.: r. r.J.
.
I ... -del EooS
:
•
.
.
.y . r; : •/.' . " . y-. V; ° y •
- y .
’’
'
.
'
••
•
. >
jrl .
.
t ... -j . • •• 1 v o
i. Jr abi\ ,1c • • £'
a.. w ,
r
•
.
say. . r. • • He • : oj J: "OH .if ‘ V : ; IHvyr.f
-
:
; i. " i j --
_
-
... ..
:f j
' n . f e;f e
'
‘
.
'.
•'‘
r
« . l-j • ;
r
"
....
•
.y
.
• v • ' J yyy vy‘7
,,.y • : - r ' ., -
-
y; J '
.
'
•
<. ;
.
-
i xf v n
.
... . «
But the Socialists were preaching two conflicting
doctrines at that time. While on ’ideological* grounds they
advocated help to the Republican Government of Spain } ’pacifism,*
simultaneously was receiving their attention. ( The Left wing
of the French Socialist Party and in particular the Federation
de la Se ine, under the leadership of M. Pivert, was at this
time distracted between an extreme pacifism and a proclivity
towards Trotskyism. M. Pivert was conducting simultaneously
a campaign for the complete disarmament of France, and a
ftnm
r
o
’,7i f^ (lm.www ti n campaign
for the active support of the Spanish Popular Front by France)
and "minister^ of both parties had equally to reckon with an
opposition of the Right whose attitude towards Popular front in
Spain and France alike, was not simply detached or unsympathetic
u
but was positively hostile. The French Opposition was parti-
ed
cularly resenting the labour unrest which was becoming stronger
everyday since the advent of the Popular Front. The govern-
ment's hand were full due to the dual task of inducing the
workers to return to work and inducing the employers to ac-
e
quiese in legislation which would result in bringing the unrest
in workers to an end. For a French Government who were strugg-
ling to tide ovey a long overdue and in consquence, now semi-
revolutionary social change, the avoidance of war in the
immediate future was all important. While an outbreak of war,
involving France, would almost certainly frustrate and undo
social reforms, which the French Socialists, especially, had at
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*
heart, the mere possibility of having followed a foreign
policy - no matter how legitimate in itself - from which war
might result would also give^ the opposition a new and power-
ful lever for engineering the overthrow of a Government whose
fall it desired on more controversial domestic grounds.
On 25th July 1935, the Cabinet held an emergency
meeting about the Spanish situation, when it is believed, the
first decision regarding non-intervention was taken. The true
originator of the policy of non-intervention was M. Alexis
Leger, the permanent under Secretary at the Quai d'Orsay. He
was no reactionary and certainly no pro-German. He v/as at
the top of the list of the French diplomats whom the Germans
wanted dismissed and he was the first to be dismissed as soon
as the 'collaborationists' took charge at Bordeaux. His de-
cision was therefore taken on unimpeachable grounds of French
interests. On these limited grounds, it cannot have been so
very foolish when it gradually conquered the mind of his
Chief, M. Yvon Delbos and later that of the whole Cabinet.
Nor was this conversion easy. In fact it must have been heart
rending. The last word was pronounced on a direct question
put by President Lebrun to the War-Secretary, M, Daladier,
who had remained silent throughout the whole discussion during
the Cabinet meeting which debated it. "Will the War-Secretary
take responsibility for sending war material out of France at
this moment." The War-Secretary answered "No." That
settled the matter
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In a communique of the 3rd August announcing the
appeal which, in the meantime, France had made to other Powers
to adopt a common policy of non-intervention in concert with
her; it was again mentioned that she was provisionally
practising non-intervention unilaterally. The opposing thesis
was put forward in strong terms on the 5th August in a speech
©V*
delivered at Lille by M. Jafthaux, the Secretary General of the
Confederation Generale du Travail.
"In the face of the Spanish situation there can be no
neutrality for the conscientous worker. The old dogma
of non-intervention has cost us dear and now threatens
to cost us even more. The defeat of the Spanish
workers may well prove our-defeat, not only from the
social point of view, but even the defeat of our
country. .. .We want peace. But there will only be true
peace when those who wish for war are utterly power-
less. The day dictatorship is vanquished, on that day
social justice will come into its own and peace
reign over the world." 1 *
Meanwhile the parties of the Left continued to hold
the demonstrations, expressing their complete agreement and
solidarity with the Spanish Government. The opposition to
the Government’s non-intervention policy was getting louder
everyday. So the Prime Minister decided to appeal personally
and he got the opportunity on the 5th September, when at his
own request he was given a hearing at a demonstration organi-
zed by the Federation Socialiste de la Seine; and after his
appearance had been greeted with shouts of f Des avions pour
^ l’Espagne* he courageously grappled with the formidable
question of the difference between his own policy and the
feelings of his party. He told his audience that he had not
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changed; that his own feelings in regard to Spain were still
just the same as theirs; that he was well aware that the
maintenance of the Legal Government of the Spanish Republic
would guarantee to Prance, in the event of European compli-
cations, the security of her Pyrenaan frontier and of her
communications with North Africa*, Whereas the ’commitments
and ambitions’ of the Spanish Nationalists were obscure. He,
then, confronted his audience with the hard fact that, if the
lawful Spanish Government were legitimately supplied with arms
from some countries, there would be a countervailing illegiti-
mate supply of arms from ’other' countries to the Spanish
rebels.
"I know quite well what each one of you is wishing for
from the bottom of his heart. I know it very well.
I understand it very well. You would like a situation
to be reached in which deliveries of arms might be
made to the advantage of the regular Government and
might not be made to the advantage of the rebel forces.
Of course you want that. In other countries, people
want exactly the opposite.
M. Blum then went on to forecast the consequences of
an unrestricted foreign competition in supplying arms to the
two combatants parties in Spain for the peace of Europe as a
whole; and he put it to his audience that the conclusion of
an international non-intervention agreement was the only way
of salvation. In his peroration he declared with vehemence
that he personally would never consent to be a party to any
kind of preventive action that could only be justified by
a belief in the ultimate inevitability of war.
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"I refuse ( he declared) to regard war as possible
today on the ground that it might be necessary or
inevitable tomorrow."’’
At a private meeting on the 7th September between
M. Blum and M. Thorez the leader of the French Communist
Party, the latter did not yield to the Socialist Prime Minister
efforts to win him over to the French Government’s, non-
intervention policy; and he continued his attack on the
G0vernment in an article oublished in L fHumanite f on the Sth.
On the 12th July, 1937, at a session of the French Socialist
Party Congress at Marseilles, M. Blum again defended his
policy in terms that were quite as uncompromising as and
distinctly more provocativethan** those that he had used in
Paris on the 6th September 1936,
f,
I accept full responsibility for what we have done in
this matter (he now declared in retrospect)
,
though
I agree that many of our hopes have been deceived.
Thanks to the lie of non-intervention, peace has been
preserved," 1 *
While M. Blum was thus expressing his thanks to
the lie of non-intervention, the two dictators were busy in
changing the lie to a farce. It was evident that the
dictators could hardly be diverted from their courses by
passing resolutions and issuing non-committal communiques.
They only understood one language and that was the language
of the fiftst. There was one occasion on which the French
Government did take the risk of insisting upon the cessation
of an alleged infraction of the Non-Intervention Agreement
by one of the ’Axis’ Powers and that v/as in January 1937, when
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a Ppench protest against reported German military activities
in the Spanish presidios and the Spanish Zone of Morocco
was supported hy a naval and military demonstration. This
firmness on the French Government’s part produced its intended
effect; hut ^this was an exception which proved the rule of
French acquiescence in Italo-German breaches of the Agreement.
But the situation in Republican Spain was con-
tinuously deteriorating to the alarm of Paris. This was ex-
pressed on the 9th September 1937, at a meeting of the
Executive Committee of the French Socialist - Radical Party,
when the Minister for War declared that
"However great may be our real desire to remain faithful
to the policy of non-intervention, we cannot allow this
policy to become a death-trap- that is, to lead to the
destruction of our-communications with North Africa or
create a menace on our Pyrenaen frontier. In the life
of a nation resolved to maintain its own greatness
,
there are certain moments when it is obliged to say "No”.
But, alas.’ the simple word ’No’ was never said.
A similar warning was given by M. Delbos in the
Assembly of the League of Nations at Geneva on the 18th
September 1937; and again at a meeting of the French Socialist
Radical Party Congress at Lille on the 29th October 1937.
"We are now (he declared on this occasion) in the
decisive phase. It is evident that the present
negotiations cannot oontinue indefintely. We demand
effective respect for the territorial integrity and
political independence of Spain. We insist sharply
on the withdrawal of the volunteers fighting in Spain,
combined with the guarantee that further volunteers
shall not be sent there." 1 '
These warnings were not, however, followed up by
1. To'SNfcEt, I4£.
.o :»•
’ ;<
"c-
t-
'
.
I
’
.
.
' eraaii
v
• ' 1
r.*
'> onooo r ' • ri
,./ r'T ?o , I o I: oi ni ioio/oo o r o :n ’ a
.
'
.
.
.
o'
..
'
;i ‘.r ; v: . Ir • ; t
' /'
•
'
.
'
' O • • ‘ ' •
.
.
•'
: >v .
-
' ....
*
*
,
;
*
.
:
.
.
o v -f O ' on : : ;r..o'i X ' r: o "to v'o, o'.
> ..
'
:
l 6
.
.
•
'
'
.
'
: .
•
'
.
.
‘
.
'
'
O' " • ' '
,
,;o'i O'.:./ oo'O o.o.-tv' o ;'i
effective action when it came to the point. (M. Delbos's
stand on the 18tfr September, 1937, was taken seriously enough
in Rome to cause instructions to be sent to the permanent
representative of Italy at Geneva, Signor Bova-Scoppa, to give
explicit and sweeping assurance to M, Delbos on the 22nd
September ). The French Government’s continued adherence to
their non-intervention policy, in spite of their own misgivings
was perhaps partly due to the pressure of two external forces
which reinforced the French Government's own spontaneous re-
luctance to risk any immediate breach of the general peace.
There was a pressure from the British Government and there
was a pressure from the French Right.
The British Government were sometimes accused by the
Opposition of having forced the policy of non-intervention
upon an unwilling Fr ench Government in the first instance.
This was denied by the British Government, and M. Blum con-
curred with Mr. Eden in stating publicly and repeatedly that
the initiative in practising non-intervention themselves, and
in calling upon other Governments to join France in adopting
this policy had been genuinely the French Government’s own.
"it is suggested," said Mr. Eden in the House of
Commons at Westminster on the 29th October 1936," that
the French Government took their initiative under
strong British pressure. Some even go so far as
to say that we threatened the French Government with
all sorts of pains and penalties if they did not do
this thing. Of course, there is not a word of truth
in that story. It is pure fabrication. The French
took the initiative on their own account...." 1 -
But the fact that the French Government should have
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been the one officially to take the initiative of proposing,
late in July 1936, the conclusion of a Non-Intervention
Agreement came as a shock to democrats everywhere. For
Socialists it was especially disagreeable that it was M. Le cn
Blum who, as head of the French Government, sponsored the
scheme. Throughout the whole of the Spanish War the conduct of
the Second International was to be blighted by this original
error. The various sections of the Second International thought
it incumbent on them to support a policy that, ostensibly at
least, had been fathered by the distinguished leader of the
French Socialist Party. But Senor Alvarez del Vayo has a
different story to tell.
"The simple truth is that Non-Intervention was fathered
in London. The legal experts of the British Foreign
Office must not have been very proud of their brain-child;
for they made such efforts to attribute its paternity to
a person less suspect than they of hostility to democratic
principles. In M. Blum and the French Government they
found the ideal sponsors for their creation and thus they
were able to kill two birds with one stone. On the one
hand they were able to avoid what v/ould surely have been
a quick and dangerous revulsion from the millions of
supporters of the Popular Front in France who would
certainly have raged against the plan had it been frankly
labelled what it was, the work of a British Tory Govern-
ment. On the other hand they were able to justify the
plan to their own Labour Opposition, in Parliament and in
the country, by evoking its supposed paternity. And the
more ductile British Labour leaders were quick to declare
that what was good enough for Blum was good enough for
them." 1«
In the preface to the English edition of that revela-
tory book by Mr. E. M. Dzelepy - The Spanish Plot "Pertinax"
(Andre Geraud) tells us how "at the beginning of August M.
Leon Blum was informed that the guarantee given by Great Britain
1. (Freedom's Battle-by Alvarez del Vayo; Page 67).
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to maintain the frontiers of Prance would not remain valid in
a
the event of independent French action beyond the Pyrenees.
This was the origin of the policy of Non-Intervention.
Senor Alvarez del Vago, further continues in the
same context -
"This British warning, as we know at the time, was
conveyed to M. Delbos, the French Minister of Foreign
Affairs in the course of a visit by Sir George Clerk,
British Ambassador to Paris. Sir George is under-
stood to have said that if France should find herself
in conflict with Germany as a result of having sold
war material to the Spanish Government, England would
consider herself released from her obligations under
the Locarno Pact V would not come to help. From
that day on, the Q uai d'Orsay, in all that referred
to Spain, became a branch of the Downing Street. . •• •
"Everytime I tricdto convince our French friends that
their Spanish policy was suicidal, I heard from
them with sorrow the same evasions." It is in
London that you. should exert yourselves" they would
say." l.
With these conflicting statements from responsible
persons it is hard to say how far the British Government were
responsible in the framing of the Non-Intervention Policy.
But, a knowledge of the British Government’s attitude and
a wish to fall in with it, may have been one of the con-
siderations in Mr. Blum's mind at the time when he was
arriving at his decision; and certainly the French policy had
no sooner been accepted - with lip service, though not, in all
cases, at heart - by the other Powers than the British
Government took the lead in the endeavour to secure its
execution - and this vis-a-vis France, as well vis-a-vis
the three 'totalitarian' Powers.
1. (Freedom's Battle, Page 69).
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Non-Intervention later became a specificially
British rather than a specificially French policy; and in
October 1937 the French Government were reported to have
been restrained from reopening their frontier for the export
of French war materials to Spain by British representations
on the lines of M. Blum’s representations, 12 months back
to the French Left.
But the volte-face of the French Right was the most
surprising, since they had been all during the past such
jealous guardians of the nations interests: It is possible
that the views of the French Right were coloured to some
extent by the fact that the German intervention on behalf of
the Spanish Nationalists was on a smaller scale and re-
ceived considerably less publicity than Italian intervention.
The prospect that General Franco’s victory might lead to a
predominance of Italian naval bases in the Balearics, was no
doubt less terrifying than the prospect of a purely German
hegemony would have been, especially to those sections of
French opinion which had warmly approved of the policy that
had - culminated in the visit of M. Laval to Rome in
January 1935, and inq the signature of Franco- Italian agree-
ments of the 7th January 1935. In the eyes of the French
Right the German danger to France in Spain seems to have
appeared to be mainly diplomatic and on this showing, to have
<xrj
worn essentially different appearance from the patently
military men of the German danger to France in the Rhineland.
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The 'anaesthetization * of the French Right in respect of the
menace arising from the 'Axis’ Powers intervention in Spain
seems partly to have been "induced by a fine spray of seda-
tive assurances from Spanish Nationalist quarters"; to which
the French Right were rendered highly susceptible by their
own ’ ideological
'
predisposition.
"The explanation is that during these critical years
the spectre of German militarism was crowded out
of the French Right’s field of mental vision by
the
,
to their eyes, still more horrid spectre of
'Red Revolution' let loose, no longer in some re-
mote and Scythian desert on the father side of a
broad insulating belt of German barbarism, but in
the very heart of the Latin World." 1*
To such Fr ench minds, the orgy of murder, pillage,
arson and warfare that had broken out in Spain after the
triumph of the Frente Popular was a dreadful warning of the
anarchy that might spring out of the epidemic of industrial
unrest that had subsequently broken out in France after the
triumph there of Front P 0pulaire.
1. (Sur. of Int. Aff . -1937, Vol .II Page 151:).
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THE INTERESTS AND MOTIVES OF THE BRITISH
The British interests and motives that were included.
4t> .
the House of Commons at We strains ter, characterized the British
interest in the Spanish strife as the "War of the Spanish
Obsession". There was, again, a strong reluctance in British,
as in French circles, to take the initiative in any course of
action involving a palpable risk of immediate war.
foreigners who would retain their popularity in Spain when the
war was over would be those who had practised non-intervention
’ bonafide. The argument put forward by the ’National Govern-
ment * was that the Spanish Nationalists and not the
Republican Government stood to gain on the balance from that
unrestricted competition in supplying both sides with
armaments which would be let loose if the Non-Intervention
Agreement were abandoned. In the House of Commons on the
29th October, 1935, the Prime Minister said,
"We might just as well say that a dam is not effective
because there were some leaks in it. If there are
some lea&s in the dam it may at any rate keep the
water out for the time being and you - can stop up
the leaks. It is a very different thing from
sweeping away the dam altogether. " '•
The last but one of these points of Mr. Baldwin’s
was developed by Mr. Eden in a speech made to his constituents
Then, many people in Britain believed that the only
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at Leamington on the 20th November:
"it is unhappily true that that agreement has not been
as strictly observed by all as we could wish. That
fact, however, regrettable, does not cause us in any
way to modify our decision in favour of the principle
of non-intervention. Because some who should be
firemen take a hand now and again at feeding the
flames, that is no reason why the whole fire-brigade
should leave their posts and join in fanning Europe
into a furnace."
Mr. Eden constantly reiterated the point that the
main value of the Non-Intervention Agreement lay in its pre-
venting the Spanish war from spreading and that this function
at any rate, was fulfilled by it effectively. In a dpeech
made on the 14th De cember 1936, at Bradford, Mr. Eden used
Mr. Baldwin's similie of the leaky dam again; and he also
echoed, once again, the Prime Minister’s argument that the
Non-Intervention Agreement prevented the spread of the war.
Mr. Eden made use of this similie again nine
months later in his speech, before the Assembly at Geneva on
the 20th September, 1937. But a different note was struck
in a speech, delivered on the 30th June at Walton- on-Thames
by Mr. Lloyd George, when he declared that, over the Non-
Intervention Agreement, British Minister^ had been fooled
all along and had been aware all along that they were being
fooled - by the Dictators. On the 21st December in the
House of Commons, in a colloquy between Mr. Atlee and
Mr. Chamberlain, the new Prime Minister, made what was
perhaps the clearest declaration, up to date, of what the
paramount aim of his policy was.
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"The right honourable gentleman described the policy of
non-intervention as one dictated by expediency and
he said, that the expediency had failed. . .What does
he mean by expediency? If he means that the policy
of non-intervention was designed to prevent the
conflict spreading beyond the borders of Spain - and
I agree that was the object of the policy - then*- So
far from failing it has been a complete success,"
^
But, in spite of assurances from the Cabinet
members, misgivings continued to be expressed by the
Opposition, regarding the safety of the British interests
if the course of the war in Spain continued to develop on
the lines it had been doing up to then. In the House of
Commons at Westmins ter on the 19th January 1937, Mr. Eden
gave his grounds for expecting to see the British interests
in Spain respected:
"If any hon. member believes that as the outcome of
this civil war in Spain any single foreign Power-
or pair of foreign P 0wers - is going to dominate
Spain for a generation, to rule its life, to direct
its foreign policies, then I am convinced he is
mistaken.... Unless the whole past history of Spain
is belied in this conflict the great mass of the
proud Spanish people will feel the least ill-will
to those nations which have intervened the least.
If we take the long view, and in an issue of this
kind it is the long view that counts, intervention
in Spain is not only bad humanity, it is bad politics.
The point was sharpened by the Foreign Secretary,
in a speech delivered at Lland^udno on the 15th October 1937;
"I want to make a clear distinction between non-
intervention and indifference. We are not indifferent to
the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Spain.
We are not indifferent to the foreign policy of any future
Spanish Government. We are not indifferent to the
complications which may arise in the Mediterranean as the
result of the intervention of others. We are not indifferent
to vital British interests in the Mediterranean. A clear
distinction must be made between non-intervention in what
is purely a Spanish affair and non-intervention where
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British interests are at stake
Mr. Churchill tersely wrote, at the end of a year
of Civil War that Prance was neutral and England strictly
ft Lon3
neutral. X& the lines of the above speech of Mr. Eden, ^he
Times of London, published a solemn article reminding the
W0rld that Spain had never tolerated the foreigner to keep an
inch of her soil after any civil war (clean forgetting
Gibraltar, of course). But as the year 1937 was drawing t o an
end, suspicion was growing in the ranks of the opposition that
G eneral Franco was going to be recognized as the de facto ruler
of Spain. In the House of Commons at Westminster on the 4th
November 1937, Mr. Atlee asked the Prime Minister whether the
Government had decided to accord a de facto recognition to the
Spanish Nationalists; if so when this decision was reached;
what precisely a de facto recognition signified; whether the
decision was reached in consultation with other Governments
or had been made solely by the British Government; and what
steps were being taken to give effect to it. Mr. Chamberlain
replied:
"There is no intention on the part of His Majesty’s
Government to make any variation in the attitude
which they have consistently adopted towards the
contending parties, and which is governed by the
international agreement for non-intervention to
which they have subscribed. They are, however,
bound to take account of their responsibility for
the protection of British nationals and British
commercial interests throughout the whole of Spain,
including those large areas in the North, West and
South-West parts of the country, as well as the
Spanish Zone of Morocco, of which General Franco’s
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forces are now in effective occupation. It has become
increasingly evident that the numerous questions
affecting British interests in these areas cannot be
satisfactorily dealt with by means of the occasional
contacts which have hitherto existed. Accordingly,
His Majesty’s Government have entered upon negotiations
for the appointment of agents by them and by General
franco respectively for the discussion of questions
affecting British nationals and commercial interests,
but these agents will not be given any diplomatic
status. rfhis matter is not one which required con-
sultation with other nations, but His Majesty’s
Government have kept the French Government fully
informed.
"
It was partly an admission of the defeat of
lAengk
British diplomacy. It is well known that there were powerfulA
elements in the British political life who were not averse to
the victory of General Franco, and for whom the development of
events in the above light could not have been unwholesome.
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THE INTERESTS AND MOTIVES OP ITALY
I
'‘Italy was touched by Spain less closely than Prance but
more closely than Great Britain; for Germany the
Spanish Affair was a windfall; for Russia it was a
luxury. 1.
The Italian interest in the Spanish war cannot be
explained completely in terms of the ever-growing ambitions
of a dictator. Fascist Italy seems to have been genuinely
alarmed at the prospect of seeing a Communist or Philo-
Communist regime establish itself in Spain as a whole or even
in some fraction of Spain with a sea-board on the Mediterranean
such as for example Catalonia. These considerations were set
out vigourously by Signor Gay^da in the Giornale d’ Italia of
the 20th November 1936.
"It must be said very clearly and without any useless
turns of phrase, that Italy is not prepared to see
planted in the Mediterranean, on Spanish soil, a new
centre of the Red Revolution, a new base of C 0mmunist
political and military operations. If some Great
Power has had it in mind to open at Montreux the
doors of the Mediterranean to Soviet Warships laden
with arms and explosives for the use of the world
revolution, Italy, a Mediterranean country, and
other strong, and decided nations of Europe are
determined to set a close watch and to prevent that
grave error from becoming the starting point of the
absolutely irreparable destruction of European order.
In undertaking this task the anti-communist defence
of Italy and Germany in Europe, a s also that of
Japan in Asia, will not be merely passive but will
assume such forms of reaction, though not offensive
forms, as may be imposed by the aggresive initiative
of the Soviets and of their Communist Committees, “
V
In the last week of May 1937, Signor Mussolini
declared to a representative of trie Howard-Scripps group of
American newspapers that -
1. (Surv. of Int. Aff., 1937, Vol.II, Page 178 )
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"Italy is firmly opposed to Bolshevism establishing
itself in Spain or the Mediterranean, because
Bolshevism is always the greatest menace to Europe. ii t
When Signor Mussolini decided together with h-i-e +£>«-
German number to recognize General Franco's government as the
de facto regime, he may be said to have tied his stakes to
the Nationalist's victory. On the 21st June 1937, Signor
Mussolini published the text of a congratulatory telegram
which he had sent to General Franco a propoo his capture
of Bilbao. An article, attributed to him, which was printed
in the Popolo d' Italia of the 26th June, 1937 proclaimed that,
"In this great fight, which had brought face to face
two types of civilization, Italy has not been neutral
but has fought and victory will also be hers." 2-.
In another article pointed in the same paper on the
1st Julyr* the arrival of Italian volunteers on the Nationalist
side was admitted and belauded, while Great Britain and France
were declared to have intervened as w e14 and were cast igatedfor*
for which he was praising his own countrymen. The writer
concluded by declaring that the Italian volunteers had not been
sent to Spain by the Italian Government; that only General
Franco could discharge them; and that the Italian Government
„
n
neither could or would recall them. On the 27th August 1937,
Signor Mussolini and General Franco exchanged congratulatory
telegrams over the capttiLv'e of Santander. On the same day the
Soman Press published the names of twelve Italian Generals
then serving with General Franco's forces, as well as a
casualty list, covering the period 14th-23rd August, 1937, of
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16 Italian officers and 325 men killed and 60 officers and
1616 men wounded in Spain. "In this fashion Signor Mussolini
ostentatiously dropped the mask." 1.
But in addition to the fear of Communist infection
and the desire for military prestige, there were strategic
motives for Italian intervention in Spain and this vis-a-vis
each of Italy* s two rivals in the Mediterranean: on the one
hand Great Britain and on the other hand France. Signor
Mussolini calculated that, even if he had no prospect of
outmatching the British Mediterranean fleet on the high seas,
he might still be able to force the British Navy to evacuate
the Mediterranean by pricing out of British hands the command
of the narrow waterways on which the British Navy depended for
its access to Mediterranean v/aters. These tactics were
promising because there was a possibility of establishing an
Italian command over the narrows without directly touching any
of those British fortresses and naval bases by means of which
the present British command over the narrows was maintained.
"Supposing that the Spanish Nationalists were to make
themselves masters of Spain, thanks in large measure
to Italy’s diplomatic and military support, it would
be fully with in the soverign rights of a victorious
and self-confident Nationalist Spain, to fortify and
arm, as heavily as she chose, not only all the
European coastline of the straits, on either flank of
Gibraltar, but also the four Spanish presidios, on or
off, the African shore. If a Nationalist Spain, were
to exercise her own soverign rights im this way and
were at the same time to show her gratitude to Italy*
for having been her friend in need by giving Italy
military and naval ’facilities’ on Spanish soil and
in Spanish territorial waters, without any cession,
or even lease, of Spanish territory, what in such
1. (Sur. of Int.Aff. 1937, Vol II, Page 182.)
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circumstances, could Great Britain do or even say?". 1.
There was another aspect to this problem. The
principal motive of the French in their persistent refusal,
to agree to the demand for Franco-Italian naval parity, which
the Italians had been pressing ever since the close of the
General War of 1914-18, was a French determination to retain
command over the sea-routes between the French ports on the
European and the French ports on the African side of the
Mediterranean, in order to keep open, for the French General
Staff, the possibility of assembling both the metropolitan and
the African French Army on either continent at will. If Italy
could gain the power to prevent the fulfilment of this funda-
mental postulate of French strategy, she would be gaining the
power virtually to halve the military strength of France on
land.
In conclusion, it may be said, that the Fascist
dictator understood his interests well together with the
democracies' weaknesses and with a shrewd game^ succeeded
in outwitting his opponents.
»
1. (Sur. of Int. Aff. 1937, Vol II, Page 184.)
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THE INTERESTS AND MOTIVES OF GERMANY
Germany,who was Italy's partner in the violation of
of the Non-Intervention Agreement in the Spanish Nationalist's
favour, had interests and motives which corresponded with those
of Italy in their nature, but not in their relative importance.
Like Italy, Germany was concerned to combat 'Red Revolution'
in Spain, and like Italy again, she was interested in obtain-
ing strategic 'facilities' in Spanish territory and territorial
waters that would give Germany strategic advantages as aginst
the two W«^-European democratic Powers. Intervention in Spain
was only a particular application of the idea which had moved
Herr Hitler to conclude the ' Anti-Commintern Pact'.
On the 9th September, 1937, Dr. Goebbels making a
speech at Nuremberg declared:
"it is here (in Spain) that the decision must be made
between Bolshevism that is to say destruction and
anarchy, on the one side, and authority that is to
say order and construction, on the other. . .What is
happening that unfortunate Spain today may happen
tomorrow in any other country where the people have
not enough judgment or sense of realities to recog-
nize the danger that threatens them, and in conse-
quence to create means and possibilities of meeting
it effectively. Spain is now the plague spot where
the disease has broken out. Here the symptons of
this dangerous infection are shown most clearly and
plainly. Therefore a discussing of the Spanish question
must include the revelation of the international
"\S3»ifi cations of the World Revolution planned by the
Bolshevists, of which the events in Spain are only a
part. " '•
Besides, the nightmare of ( encirclement ' had always
weighed heavily on the German's own minds; and the prospect
of being able at last to turn the tables on France thus had.
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for German^ eyes, the double attraction of appearing to be both
a telling stroke of revenge and an effective piece of strategy.
Germany, like Italy, was bent upon going full way to
help General Franco, unless some stiff opposition, which was
unlikely, came from the democracies. And, when on one occasion
the French Government made it clear that they did not intend to
allow Germany to establish herself in Morocco, on any account,
the representations were followed by fruitful results. Herr
Hitler, himself, saw the French Ambassador in Berlin, M.
\wi
Francois - P0ncet on the 11th January^and 'spontaneously’
declared to him that Germany had not and never had had any
intention of infringing the integrity of Spain or Spanish
possessions in any way. This step in Berlin was said to have
been the outcome of a conference between Herr Hitler and the
high officers of the Reichswehr at Berchtesgaden on the 9th
January,
In any case, Herr Hitler did abandon - if he ever
seriously entertained the idea of sending in Spanish a full-
blown German Army like the Italian Army that was sent there by
his confederate Signor Mussolini. The unpopular experiment of
drafting German infantry to the Spanish front seems to have beeii.
abandoned altogether at an early date in the year 1937; and the
;
German force in Spain was thenceforward substantially confined
to technicians who, if they were anti-aircraft - gun crews,
would be working behind the lines where there was comparatively
little danger, or who, if they were tank crews or air-men were
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semi-professionals who might be persuaded to take it as all in
the days work if they were asked to risk their lives for the
sake of testing the efficiency of their infernal machines.
The foreign infantry whom General Franco needed were
duly supplied by Signor Mussolini and from the political point
of view Germany seems actually to have gained in the Spanish
Nationalist's good graces, thanks to the numerical inferiority
of the German to the Italian contingent there.
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THE INTERESTS AND MOTIVES OF THE U.S.S.R .
In the Spanish war that broke out in 1936, the
heaviest makeweight against the breach of the Non-Intervention
Agreement by Italy and Germany was the breach of it by the
Soviet Union; and as Prof. Toynbee says, in this long -
sustained competition in breaking faith it was the two "Fascist?
Powers who showed the greater staying power. The Soviet Union
laboured under two handicaps which were common to her and to
Germany. The handicaps common to the Soviet Union and
Germany were, both of them, effects of geographical distance.
If Germany was remote from the Spanish theatre of war, Russia-
lying, as she did, on the farther side of Germany - was remote
a fortiori; and therefore for Russia, as for Germany, but for
Russia in a greater-degree, military intervention in the
Spanish war was both a political luxury and a strategic risk.
It was a luxury because a victory for the Spanish Nationalists
and their Italian and German allies in the Iberian Peninsula
would involve no direct military or political danger to the
S 0viet Union's own national security, even if it did result
in the attachment of a Nationalist Spain to the Rome-Berlin
M i.Axis. Because it would affect Russian interests only in-
directly, through its adverse effect on the interests of
Russia's West-European ally France.
But one other handicap from which the Soviet Union
suffered was the weakness displayed from time to time by the
two Western-democracies. Whatever energy the Anti-Fascist
.
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groups could evince was being undermined by the desire of the
majority of the British Conservative Party to come to terms
with Signor Massolini and in order to stop Hitler on the road
to Vienna on which it was expected the Fuhrer would start
soon. The two dictators as Salvador de Madariaga wrote, were
proceeding in Spanish affairs with the leisure of men who
feel sure of their victory,
Stalin, on the other hand, was beginning to wonder
whether the Litvinov policy of collaboration with the Western
democracies through the International Peace Campaign and the
Popular Front tactics was to succeed or to fail. The horizon
was darkening both over Europe and over the Pacific and he
was not ready. To quote Salvador de Madariaga again,
,f In either case, whether he fought Hitler under the
flag of Geneva or ran quicker than Chamberlain to
hold Mr. Hitler's hand in a gesture of friendship to
prevent the unpredictable Fuhrer from grasping his
revolver, it was imperative that he should be strong
in Spain. Whatever we may think - as Spaniards of
the effect of Stalin's policy on Spain, whatever we
think of those of our countrymen who allowed them-
selves to become his tools in Spain, we have to look
at the matter from the point of view of Mr. Stalin,
both as the head of the Russian stake i.e., as a
Russian patriot and as the Pope of the Communist
faith. His aims in Spain were essentially the same
as those of the two Fascist dictators, though of
course for opposite reasons; to secure a Western
outpost for his side against the dangers which were
lurking ever larger on the European horizon. .... It
was therefore indispensable for Stalin to gain time
to allow for the internal evolution of the Spanish
Revolution. (as there was no unity on the side of
the Loyalists) . Meanwhile he would be both preparing
for the coming war, if war there was to be, and
seeking an agreement with Hitler which would enable
him either to ward off the Soviet-German war for
good and all or to gain more time still for his tanks
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and aeroplanes. In terms of Spain this meant carrying
on the Spanish war as long as possible while strength-
ening his position there while the war lasted. The
first added to his time for negotiating with Hitler;
the second raised the value of his assets in the
negotiations. " 1.
In the matter of rish, however, there was a world of
differences between theory and practice; for, in view of the
tested - and proven pacific-mindedness of the French and
British Governments, the Italian and Germans could and did,
discount the risk of BRanco-British naval sanctions almost to •
vanishing point and were justified by the events which showed
them that they had broken the Non-Intervention Agreement with
impunity. On the other hand, the practical risk which the
Russians were running was much greater, since the adversaries
with whom they had to reckon were not a ? democratic’ Great
Britain and France but a ’totalitarian' Germany and Italy.
For while there was good reason for believing that the ’Axis**
Powers ' had no more stomach than the Soviet Union or the two
West-European Powers had for a general war against opponents
of their own calibre, it had been proven and tested that they
were willing to sail much nearer to the wind than the two
Western Powers, at any rate, would be willing to follow them.
Signor Mussolini's readiness to skirt the extreme
limit of his margin of safety was illustrated afresh and this
VVCA.
mainly at the expense of Russian shipping, in the 'ppaetical
'
submarine campaign in the Mediterranean in the month of August
1937; and although this particularly flagrant piece of foul
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play partly defeated itself by provoking the British and
French Governments to take effective counter-measures at
Nyon, it also no doubt partly served the purpose of con-
veying to Moscow the impression that Italy might perhaps be
willing to precipitate a general war rather than tolerate a
Russian intervention in Spain on the Italian §cale.
But there was another difficulty, a question of
personal prestige for Stalin vis-avis Trotsky.
’’Stalin was, in fact, now in danger of being present-
ed in Spain with a choice of actively taking up the
repudiated policy of his discomfited personal rival
or else allowing it to become manifest to his own
followers in the All-Union Communist Party- not to
speak of the Stalinian Communist Church throughout
the world - that Trotsky had been right, after all,
in maintaining that ’Stalinism* was synonmous with
’betrayal’ If in these circumstances, Stalin
were to adopt an attitude of neutrality towards
the conflict in Spaih, he might have to face a
complete collapse of the Third (Communist) Inter-
national and though an acceptance of this consequence
might be a logical corollary of the Stalinian policy
of ’Socialism in One Country’, it would be hardly
politic for the conqueror of Trotsky to allow this
train of cause and effect to become conspicuous. It
wasa
.
poetic justice that thus disturbed Stalin’s
triumph in the Kremlin by unfortunately condemning
him to dispose of Trotsky’s Spanish legacy. 1*
From the very st&rt of the hostilities, Moscow
had been collecting subscriptions and holding demonstrations
for the Republican Spain. In the Soviet Union press of the
20th November 1936, Mr. Eden was taken to task for his remark
in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 19th, that so
far as non-intervention was concerned, he thought that there
were other Governments more to blame haa* than those of
1. (Sur. of Int. Aff. 1937, Vol.II,Page 197-98)
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Germany and Italy. While it might be difficult to determine
whether Russian German or Italian intrigue had been the first
in Spanish field in the period preceding the outbreak of war
in Spain on the 17th July 1936, there appeared to be little
doubt that, after hostilities had opened, the first acts of
military intervention - in the sense of dispatch of arms, and
of men to manipulate them, were committed by Germary and
Italy.
"The military intervention of the Soviet Union in Spain
seems to have been not only subsequent to this but
also consequent to this. 1*
Like Germany, the Soviet Union seems virtually to
have confined its intervention in Spain to the despatch of
technicians, who, in the Russian case, seem to have been
mainly military instructors, airmen, artillery officers and
staff officers. One of the most effective ways in which the
Soviet Union helped the Popular Front in Spain was by sending
foodstuffs for the sustenance of the population of the
industrial cities whose normal Peninsular sources of food-
supply had fallen into the Nationalist's hands. The Import
of foodstuffs into SDain, it may be mentioned, was no breach
of the Non-Intervention Agreement.
1. (Sur. of Int. Aff .1937, Vol. II. Page 199.)
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THE INTERESTS AND MOTIVES OP PORTUGAL
Portugal was the only other country than France, who
shared with France, the misfortune of having a common land
frontier with the Peninsular State that was the theatre of
hostilities. Portugal, from the beginning, exhibited open
and unashamed interest in the victory of the rebels. Perhaps,
due to being herself under the rule of a dictator, she could
not do otherwise. Her ideological sympathies were with
’totalitarian’ states. Dp. Salazar, the dictator of the
country, described his own attitude frankly in the following
passage of a speech of the 6th July 1957.
nWe have special interests of our own in the Peninsula
and run risks which other countries do not. We be-
lieve that public opinion in certain countries, es-
pecially in France and Great Britain, is ill-informed
as to the true nature of the Spanish problem and of the
events that have taken place in that country. Some
people do not believe in the Communist peril; we, on
the other hand, feel it, see it, and fear that
C 0mmunism, with the connivance of other-countries may
take root in Spain, and so destroy anjr chance of the
Spanish people working out their own political
salvation, for there could be no national liberty or
independent choice in a state largely controlled by
several Internationals. Hence our uncompromising
attitude from the very start; hence our opposition
to any form of non-intervention which should pre-
judice the chances of Spanish Nationalism, which
stands between Portugal and Iberian Communism; hence
the odium which we have incurred in certain quarters
- we may add unjustifiably.” 1 *
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CHAPTER POUR
BIRTH OF THE "NON-INTERVENTION" POLICY
The policy of non-intervention in Spain which was
adopted on the initiative of Prance, and of which Great Britain
subsequently became the leading advocate, was put into effect
six weeks after the outbreak of the Civil War, The object of
the promoters of the policy was to prevent the Spanish conflict
from expanding into an open war between Great Powers on an
arena extending far beyond the bounds of the Iberian Peninsula
and at the same time to safeguard the independence of the
Spanish nation and its freedom to decide its own destiny. But
as the Spanish Republican Government pointed out, their un-
happy country itself became the theatre of an international
war in fact
•
Disappointing as the results of the Non-Intervention
Agreement were to prove in practice, it is probably true to
say that at no time did the danger that the conflagration would
spread all over Europe appear as acute as it had seemed during
the first five or six weeks of the Civil War. Says Prof .Toynbe e
"The States of Europe might still be standing un-
comfortably, close to the edge of the precipice;
but the facts that the Governments had entered
into an agreement not to intervene in Spain and
that they continued to pay lip-service to the
principle of non-intervention (even though some
of them were engaged at the same time in evading
to the best of their ability the obligations into
which they had entered)
,
indicated that even the
most aggresive- seeming among them were genuinely
afraid of taking the final- step which might plunge
them into the abyss." i #
1. (Sur. Int. Aff.l937,Vol.II Page 222)
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Since French sympathies or at any rate the
sympathies of most of the supporters of the Popular Front -
were naturally with the Spanish Republicans, the French
Government might have been expected to take the line that there
was no reason for refusing to let the legally constituted
Government of Spain have munitions, and other supplies which
they needed to help them in putting down an insurrection.
But, the decision, as is now well-known, was taken against
this course.
But, in the meantime, an incident occurred, ( the
landing of Italian air-craft on the French Moroccan soil,
which has already been alluded to) which definitely proved
that foreign nations were intervening to the advantage of the
Nationalists. M. Blum and his colleagues came to the con-
clusion that if the danger of a general ideological war was to
be averted and the trouble confined within the frontiers of
Spain, something more was required than a unilateral decision
on their part to withhold supplies from one party to the con-
flict. They realized indeed, that in view of the Republican
sympathies of their supporters it would be impossible for them
to implement their own decision not to send supplies to Spain
unless some check could be imposed on the flow of foreign
munitions to the Spanish Nationalists. So, a proposal for an
agreement to refrain from intervening in the Spanish Civil
War by sending supplies of war material to either party was
made by the French Government to Governments of Great
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Eritain and Italy on the l&th August 1936.
The British Governments response to this flbtench
demarche was prompt and favourable. In a note of the 4th
August, they showed their willingness and suggested that other
States which had a special interest in the Spanish question
(chiefly, Germany, Russia and Portugal) he included in the
negotiations. In the hope of speeding up the negotiations the
French Government circulated the draft text of a declaration
on the 6th August. This provided for a formal renunciation
of intervention, direct or indirect, in the Spanish civil
war and laid it down that the export to Spain of all war-
material, including aircraft of all kinds and not excepting,
material which had been ordered before the civil war began,
should be prohibited by the signatui^ee and that there should
be an exchange of information regarding the measures taken by
the various Governments to put this prohibition into effect.
The prohibition of export of war material from
France to Spain was put into effect on the 9th August. (The
prohibition on the transit of material through France did not
become, effective until the 8th September.) The French
suggestion was approved by all; but in diplomatic language an
approval does not necessarily mean acceptance of concrete
terms; and the 'Fascist' Powers now gave the first example of
so (bdey
tactics which were to become unpleasantly familiar*. By
delaying their definitive acceptance or refusal to a
suggestion they protracted the negotiations without allowing
.
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them to break down and laid themselves open to the suspicion
that they were deliberately trying to gain time in the hope
that the help which they were giving to the Nationalists might
turn the scale in the latter’s favour before a decision which
might limit activities on their behalf has been taken.
On the 5th August, the French diplomatic represent-
ative in Moscow was informed that the Soviet Government were
prepared to accept the principle of non-intervention in Spain,
but that they considered it essential that Portugal should be
a party to the Agreement, and the foreign assistance to the
rebels should cease immediately; By the 10th August the
S 0viet Government had signified their approval of the draft
text of an agreement which the French Government had forward-
ed to them.
The attitude of Italy was less favourable. Italy
declared to adhere in principle to the thesis of non-
intervention. The Italian Government asked whether ’moral
solidarity’ with one of the parties to the agreement ( as
expressed in public demonstrations, etc.) did not constitute
a noisy and dangerous forqj of intervention; and what methods
of control over the observance or non-observance of the
undertaking not to intervene in Spain were contemplated.
For the Italian suggestions, there was a strong suspicion in
France that they were put forward in a deliberately ob-
structionist spirit. The Italian reply to the French pro-
posals was therefore not of a nature to encourage the hope of
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a successful outcome of the negotiations at an early date.
*
On the 9th August, the German charged Affaires in
London gave the British Government a formal assurance that
no war material was being sent or would be sent to the
Spanish Nationalists from Germany and that German warships in
Spanish waters would not take any action which could be in-
terpreted as showing sympathy with or giving support to the
Nationalists. Herr Von Neurath was also said to have assured
the French Ambassador, when the latter broached the subject
of non-intervention, that Germany’s policy towards Spain was
one of strict neutrality. The German Foreign Minister's
first response to the French proposal was said to have be en
favourable but in the subsequent diplomatic conversations in
Berlin the German attitude became stiffer. By the middle of
August, in addition to Great Britain, Russia was the only
other State, within the group whose adhere^ewas considered
essential, which had yet returned a definite favourable reply.
On the 15th August decalarat ions were exchanged in
Paris by which the French and British Governments placed on
record their decision to abstain vigorously from all inter-
t
vention direct or indirect, in the internal affairs of Spain
and announced that they intended to prohibit the export direct
or indirect, the re-export and the transit to any destination
in Spain, the Spanish possessions or the Spanish Zone of
Morocco, all arms, munitions and materials of war, as well
as of all aircraft, complete or in parts and of all warships.
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Finally, they pledged themselves to put these measures into
force as soon as the Governments of Germany, Italy, the
U.S. S. R. and Portugal had adhered to the declaration. A
statement from Fgreign Office in London declared:
"It should he realized that the maintenance of a
strict and impartial attitude of non-intervention
is essential if the unhappy events in Spain are to
be prevented from having serious repercussions
elsewhere. British subjects who assist either
side in Spain by land, sea or air, are not only
running grave risks for themselves, but are render-
ing it more difficult to arrive at the proposed
agreement. They must not expect to receive any
assistance or support whatever in difficulties
which they may meet with during such enterprises,
which run counter to the objects which His Majesty’s
Government are seeking to attain." 1.
On the 17th August, the German Government had not-
ified the French Government their willingness to accept the
terms laid down in the Anglo-French declaration as soon as
some little demands were fulfilled. On the 21st August,
Italy "allowed herself to be persuaded" not to make the
prohibition of 'moral solidarity’ an essential condition for
their acceptance of an agreement to forbid the supply of war
materials to Spain and they adhered to the Anglo-French
declaration on the same terms as Great Britain, and France
themselves. On the 21st August, also, the Portugese
Government declared in writing their acceptance not to in-
tervene in the Spanish conflict. But they hedged their
acceptance about with so many reservations that they retained
very considerable freedom of action. On the 23rd August, the
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G0vernment of the U.S.S. R. notified the French Government of
their formal adherence to the declaration on the usual con-
dition of reciprocity. On the 24th August, the German
,
-
Government, informed the French Government that in view of the
fact that the other interested Governments had now accepted
the French Proposals, they themselves would waive the con-
dition that their negotiations over the Lufthansa machine
must first be concluded and would put into force immediately
the measures for which the declaration provided.
The twenty- one Governments which ultimately acceptec
the Non-Intervention Agreement, in addition, to the six
specially interested Powers were: Albania, Austria, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece,
JUCioS LftTV/A, tfTHORMifi, LUX£M SOURS, NE
Hungary, The Irish Free State^, Norw^r, Poland, Rumania, Sweden
,
and Turkey# It will be noticed that the only European State
which was absent from the list was Switzerland, and the
Swiss Federal Government had informed the French Government
that, while they felt precluded by the permanent neutrality
of the Swiss Confederation from participating in the suggeste<
joint declaration: they had on their own initiative taken
certain measures designed to secure the same object f
As soon as the successful conclusion of the first
phase of tlfce non-intervention negotiations had been ensured
by the adherence of Germany to the agreement, the French
Government had taken a further step. They had invited the
Powers to take part in further discussions and had suggested
i.
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that the most convenient method of arranging for the exchange
of information which was an integral part od their plan, might
be the establishment of a Committee in London, composed of
representatives of all the parties to the agreement. Up to
5th September, all States except Portugal whose attendance
was of the first importance, had consented to serve in the
Committee. The delay in accepting the French proposals for
a Non-Intervention Agreement, and the reservations which
accompanied Portugal’s final acceptance, had shown how re-
luctant Dr. Salazar’s Government were to tie their hands in
&ny way and it was said that, considerable diplomatic pressure
from France and Great Britain had been needed to secure the
A.&C.vee
issue in Lisbon, of the d^e-r^e that placed an embargo on the
export on transit of war materials to Spain. By the begin-
ning of September the Portugese Government had indicated that
they might agree to be represented on the Non-Intervention
Committee if its scope and competence were more clearly de-
fined; and after the German acceptance had been received it
was decided to summon the first meeting of the Committee on
the 9th September in the hope that by that time French and
British influence in Lisbon would have elicited a definite
acceptance
.
But Portugal was an absentee when the first meeting
of the Non-Intervention Committee took place on the 9th Sep-
tember and it was not until the end of September that the
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combined influence of Prance and Great Britain exercised
not only through diplomatic channels but also through the
medium of conversations at Geneva between Mr. Eden and
the Portugese Foreign Minister, was successful in inducing
the Portuguese Government to waive their objections to
representation on the Non-Intervention Committee.
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CHAPTER FIVE
The First Three Months (September - November 1936)
The first meeting of the Non-Intervention Committee
in London on the 9th September was attended by the representa-
tives of all the countries, save Portugal, which had accepted
the Non Intervention Agreement. The Committee elected Mr. V*. S.
Morrison as its Chairman. But before the end of September,
however, Mr, Morrison* s place as Chairman had been taken by
Lord Plymouth, one of the Under Secretaries of State for For-
eign Affairs. At the second meeting of the Committee, on the
19th September a sub-comrittee was appointed to assist the
Chairman in the day to day work of the Committee. The sub-
committee consisted of the representatives of Belgium, Czecho-
slovakia and Sweden in addition to those of the six states -
France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union and
Portugal - whose adherence to the Non-Intervention Agreement
had been required in order to bring the agreement into operatio^.
At the third meeting, on the 21st September, it was decided
that allegations of bre&ches of the Non-Intervention Agreement
should be examined by the Committee, but only if they were
sponsored by one of the States represented on the Committee.
The interchange of accusations of intervention was
opened by the Spanish Government at Geneva. The Spanish
situation was not on the agenda either of the 94th meeting of
the League Council, which began on the 18th September, or of
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the 17th session of the Assembly, which began on the 21st; but
it naturally provided one of the principle topics of discussion
in those informal conversations between statesmen for which
Council and Assembly meetings at Geneva afforded ample oppor-
tunity. Senor Alvarez del Vayo, who was representing the Span-
ish Government at Geneva in his capacity as Foreign Minister,
took advantage of the presence of the French and British For-
eign Ministers at Geneva to explain in detail his Governments
objections to a system under which the principles of Non-Inter-
vention were being observed by Governments friendly to Madrid
and disregarded by Governments friendly to Burgos. Senor Al-
varez del Vayo was said to have expressed special indignation
at the attitude of Portugal (and not without reason), whom he
accused of giving open support to the Nationalists. In hi3
speech before the Assembly on the 25th September, however,
Senor del Vayo showed greater restraint, partly, perhaps, be-
cause the president of the Assembly, Senor Saavedra Lamas of
Argentina, was known to feel sympathy with the Spanish National-
ists* cause, and he would therefore have been likely to rule
the Spanish delegate out of order if he had made detailed
accusations against particular states, Senor Alvarez del Vayo
contented himself with a statement in general terms to the
effect that non-intervention was in practice intervention a-
gainst the Government and with an appeal to his hearers to con-
sider the implications of a policy which allowed subversive
elements to receive foreign help.
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But the Spanish delegation, as Senor Alvarez del Vayo
was to write later, could not hope for any very heroic decision
on the part of either Council or Assembly. It knew they would
not dare to name the aggressor and that in no event would the
measures laid down in the Covenant be applied. He writes:
"I politely declined to assist at one of those private coni
ferences so dear to the heart of the Secretary General and
responsible for the incessant concessions and settlements
which brought the LON to its ruin I was now faced
with the task of resisting pressure not only from friend-
ly delegates, but also from certain members of the Span-
ish delegation itself who feared that we should be con-
sidered responsible if the Sixth Committee was unable to
agree upon a resolution to place before the Assembly. I
found that the only way of withstanding this pressure was
to turn my thoughts to the Spanish Front - where the self-
denying Republican Army had for months been resisting Ger*
man and Italian air and artillery bombardments - and to
the rearguard, where the people fighting for the inde-
pendence of their country were condemned to the horrors
of a war which, but for the lamentable policy of Non-
Intervention would long since have been over."
Again,
"A formula was reached whereby the British and French
Governments promised to revise their policy of Non-Inter-
vention if • in the near future* Germany and Italy had not
withdrawn their troops from Spain. ’What,* I asked before
registering our vote, 'do the honourable delegates of
Great Britain and France mean by 'the near future?*
•Probably an earlier date than the Spanish delegate
thinks,* replied Mr. Elliot, immediately seconded by
M. Delbos. But when eighteen months later, on March 6,
1939, I left Spain with the Negrin Government the »near
future* had still not been converted into the present. " 2.
Le-g^CCy
Ju4i^ia-lly, there was no possible defence for Non-
Intervention. To refuse a legitimate Government, with whom the
United Kingdom and France were maintaining normal diplomatic
relations, their indisputable right to acquire the material
necessary to subdue the revolt of a "few rebel generals was the
1. Freedom' s Battle , p. 43.
2. Freedom's Battle, p. 44.
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very extreme of arbitrary conduct."
The Spanish Governments next move was the publication
of documents presenting evidence in support of their accusations
against the 'Fascist* Powers and Portugal. Simultaneously, the
Government of the U. S. S. R. entered the lists in support of
the Spanish Government's charges. The Soviet Government
selected Portugal as their principal target for attack. In a
note of the 6th October they accused the Portuguese Government
of allowing their territory to be used as a base of operations
by the Nationalists and suggested that the Non-Intervention
Committee should consider the despatches of a Commission of
Investigation to report on conditions oir the Spanish-Portuguese
frontier. Next day they sent a further note to the Chairman of
the Non-Intervention Committee expressing the fear that repeated,
violations of the Non-Intervention Agreement had already made
the Agreement 'virtually non-existent,' declaring that they
could in no case agree 'to turn the agreement into a screen
shielding the military aid given to the rebels by some of the
participants;' and threatening to consider themselves released
from their obligations if violations of the Agreement were not
immediately stopped.
The Portuguese delegate left the meeting of the 9th
October, which had before it the Spanish documents and the
Russian accusations, when the Russian suggestion for the super-
vision of the Spanish-Portuguese frontier was mentioned - on the
ground that he could not discuss that question without further
.
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instruction from his Government. The Soviet Government, how-
ever, returned to the attack on the 12th October when M. Maisky,
their Ambassador in London, presented a note to the Chairman of
the Non-Intervention Committee asking that the C0mmittee should
be summoned again at an early date to consider a proposal for
the establishment of a system of control by French and British
ships at Portuguese ports. Lord Plymouth refused to accede to
this request on the ground that the Soviet Government had not
produced any new evidence against Portugal which required ex-
amination.
Moreover, Russia was accusing Portugal at a moment
when her own acts were open to question. The Soviet Government
could plead, of course, that under the generally accepted rules
of international law it was an offence to supply war material
to an insurgent force but perfectly legitimate to supply a
properly constituted Government; but this distinction did not
alter the fact that since the Non-Intervention Agreement had
come into force a State which supplied the legitimate Spanish
Government w^as no less guilty of a breach of its international
engagements than a State which supplied the insurgent National-
ists.
At a meeting of the Committee on the 23rd October,
the Chairman read a letter which he had received from M. Maisky
in which the Soviet Government expressed the opinion that the
best way to end "the privileged situation for the rebels' which
had been created by violations of the agreement would be to re-
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store to the Spanish Government their right to purchase arms
and to the States participating in the agreement their right
to sell them. They declared that, in any case, they could not
consider themselves bound by the agreement for non-intervention
to any greater extent than any of the remaining participants.”
On the meeting of the 28th of the Committee, M. Maisky made a
further statement on the Russian attitude. He said that until
guarantees against the supply of war material to the Spanish
Nationalists had been created,
"and an effective control over the strict fulfillment of
the obligations regarding non-intervention established,
those Governments who consider supplying the legitimate
Spanish Government as conforming to international law,
international order, and international justice are
morally entitled not to consider themselves more bound
by the agreement than those Governments who supply the
rebels in contravention of the agreement. "
The Non-Intervention Committee examined all the
evidence for and against the various States who were accusing
one another of infringing its terms. After a preliminary
examination of the evidence, the defendant Governments were
asked to supply further information
,
but in every case the
Committee ultimately returned a verdict of not proven. Apart
from the Soviet Government, all the Governments had accepted
the view that it was impossible to prove that Germany, Italy
and Portugal had infringed the Non-Intervention Agreement, Ob-
viously, this was meant to throw oil over the disturbed waters.
Similarly, Russia was given a relatively clean sheet in the
same way on the 10th November and the matter was supposed to be
dropped.
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At a meeting of the Chairman's Sub-Commit "i ee on the
29th October, Lord Plymouth initiated an attempt to work out
plans for controlling all the channels by which supplies of war
material might reach Spain. But it was realised that for a
really effective execution of the Non-Intervention Agreement
it would be essential to control not only the land and sea
routes to Spain but the air routes as well. There were, of course,
considerable technical difficulties to be overcome in the
preparation of plans of this kind, but these would probably not
have been sufficient to hinder progress very seriously if all
the States concerned had been of one mind in desiring the
application of an effective scheme of control over imports into
Spain at the earliest possible moment. But, in words of Prof.
Toynbee
,
"if there had been unanimity among the members of the
Non-Intervention Committee on this point, however, there
would have been no need for the scheme." 1«
The policy of the Fascist Powers, in these circum-
stances, was again to play for time in the epectation that they
would be able to outstrip Russia in the competition in supply-
ing assistance to the combatants in Spain during the nett few
weeks and in the hope that any system of control which might
be put into force thereafter would be efficacious enough to
prevent Russia from making up this leeway. By the second week
of November 1936 a plan for controlling land and sea traffic
with Spain had taken shape. The plan as originally drafted
provided for the posting of observers along the Spanish side of
1. Survey of International Affairs, 1937, Vol.II, p. 254
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I
the land frontiers and also in Spanish ports, where they would
supervise the unloading of cargoes and verify that they did not
contain war material. A ’communique* was published on the 13th
November in which it was announced that the committee had
provisionally accepted the plan, subject to the incorporation
into it of certain amendments and to the approval of the Govern-
ments represented on the Committee.
During the second half of November, the Chairman’s
Sub-Committee continued to work on the plan, in the light of
observations received from Governments and by the end of the
month a stage had been reached at which it was possible, in the
opinion of the Russians, French and British members of the Sub-
committee, to submit the plan for consideration to the contending
parties in Spain. The German, Italian and Portuguese representa-
tives, however, opposed the taking of this step until a scheme
for controlling air traffic had also been prepared. But on the
2nd December the Non-Intervention Committee decided that the
proposals should be submitted immediately to the Spanish Govern-
ment and to the Nationalists.
But on the 18th. November, two bombshells were thrown
into the matrix of international politics from Rome and Berlin
simultaneously, when two communiques were issued in the ’Axis*
capitals in similar though not identical terms that the Govern-
ments of Italy and Germany had decided to recognize General
Franco’s regime as the Government of Spain and to enter into
diplomatic relations with that administration. The steps which
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I)
the German and Italian Governments now took was not in itself
unexpected, hut it had been generally assumed that they would
not commit themselves until Madrid had fallen into the hands
of Nationalists.
This, however, did not help the Rebels to capture
Madrid, but it had an important effect, nevertheless, on the
course of events; for the highly important fact that the prestige
of the two Dictators would certainly suffer if the Nationalist
leader with whom they had thus publicly associated themselves
were to be defeated. On the 17th November, the day before the
announcement of German and Italian recognition of General Fran-
co's Government, a circular was issued from Burgos informing
Governments that the Nationalist command intended to use all
the means at their disposal in order to prevent war material
from reaching the Spanish Government through the port of Bar-
celona and warning foreign ships lying in the harbor to with-
draw promptly if they wished to avoid damage from the bombard-
ment of the port. On enquiry from the British Government,
General Franco agreed to the creation of a safety zone at Bar-
celona. Meanwhile, the implications of General Franco's threat
to prevent war material from reaching Barcelona by all the means
at his disposal had been giving rise to a good deal of anxiety.
By international maritime lav/, a Government or regime
whose belligerent rights had been recognized by the Governments
of other countries might exercise the right to visit and search
on the high seas ships flying the flags of those countries; but
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>
in cases where belligerency was not recognized an attempt to
interfere with foreign shipping outside territorial waters might
legitimately be resisted by force. The British Government had
to choose between recognizing a state of belligerency in Spain
permitting interference with their ships on the high seas al-
though no right to interfere existed, or resisting such inter-
ference, if necessary, by force. The British Cabinet, faced
with this problem, decided to introduce special legislation to
prohibit the carriage of munitions on British ships from any
port to Spain,
'‘At the same time it is not the intention of His Majesty’s
Government that British shipping should carry war material
from any foreign port to any port in Spain^" 1 -
declared a communique from the Government.
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CHAPTER SIX
Spanish Government Appeals to League of Nations
On the 27th November the Spanish Government appealed
to the League of Nations under Article 11 of the Covenant and
asked that the Council should meet at the earliest possible
moment to consider the position in Spain. The ’armed interven-
tion of Germany and Italy’ in the Spanish civil war had now
"culminated in the recognition of the chief of the rebels
set up as a Government by the ’wirepullers* of these same
Powers. Such a proceeding is virtually an act of aggress
against the Spanish Republic." 1 *
The object of the Spanish Government in taking this
step was presumably to make a demonstration which should win
them sympathy of the world opinion. On their appeal it was
decided that the Council should meet for its 95th (extraordinary)
session on the 10th December with the Spanish Government’s
appeal as the only question on its agenda. But the majority of
the members of the Council did not want to come definitely on
one side or the other of the Spanish fence and adopted an
attitude which was to become so injurious to the Spanish Re-
publicans. The Council dug out a precedent that it had gener-
ally refrained in the past from taking a definite line on any
dispute which some other international organ was already con-
cerning itself. The line of least resistance for the Council
was to register a pious approval of the policy of the Non-
International Committee in London and then sit back again.
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in the sessions of the Council on the 11th and 12th
December, Senor Alvarez del Vayo assured his colleagues that he
had asked for a meeting of the Council "solely for the reason
that an international war exists in fact and that this war, if
it is still not controlled, may, when it is leas t, expected,
produce a situation which can no longer he controlled, " On the
subject of non-intervention, he said that the Spanish Government
were therefore "concerned above all with making certain that the
system of control," which was now under consideration would "be
such as to give all the necessary guarantees of effectiveness."
There was another point to the case. The Spanish Gov
which,
ernment,/in accordance with the commercial treaty at that time
in force withBrance, was required to spend some million francs
in the purchase of French war material, could not even obtain
delivery of the orders placed before the outbreak of the rebel-
lion. From a political viewpoint this was tantamount to giving
Germany and Italy carte blanche to turn Spain into a satellite
of the Axis in opposition to the vital interests of Great Britain
and France. Consider the bitterness of Senor Alvarez del Vayo
when he writes
"The ‘irrefutable proof* of German and Italian intervention
which in September 1936 Messrs Delbos and Eden amiably but
insistently demanded from me, was provided by the German
and Italian governments themselves. The next diplomatic
'documents* which in spite of their persuasive power were
no better able to rouse the London Committee from its
lethargy were no documents at all, but the actual landing
of Italians in Malaga and the Italian offensive at Guada-
lajara in the month of March."
Coming to the Council meeting again, the principal
1. Freedom's Battle, p. 45.
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difficulty arose in drawing up a resolution due to Senor del
Vayo's insistence that the resolution must contain some refer-
ence to the question of foreign intervention in Spain. But,
ultimately, a compromise was arrived at and Senor Alvarez del
Vayo accepted the resolution, which was adopted unanimously,
"but he pointed out that the "step taken by the Council” did not
"exhaust the question” which the Spanish Government had raised
and he reserved "the right, should circumstances render it
necessary, to ask the Council to proceed with the examination
of the question.
"
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Prohibiting the Despatch of Volunteers to Spain
At the Chairman' 3 Sub-Committee on the 4th December,
it was decided that it should begin to examine the possibility
of extending the scope of the Non-Intervention Agreement to
cover the prohibition of the despatch of volunteers to Spain*
While the Nationalists were receiving the Italian troops in
the form of volunteers, the Spanish Government's volunteer
strength was augmented by volunteers of various nationalities
who since the beginning of the war had been making their way
into Spain. The latter were drafted into f ive International
Brigades and early in November 1936 these Brigades had their
baptism of fire as units in the battle for Madrid.
It was a report of the arrival of several thousand
Germans at Cadiz which led to the question being raised in the
Non-Intervention Committee at the beginning of December and
there were further arrivals from Germany during that month.
Italy had begun to send men to Spain before Christmas and con-
tinued the process on a rising scale throughout January and
February. But there was a difference in the 'volunteers' on
the two sides. The distinction between the two kinds of
'volunteers' was drawn with considerable effect by M. Maisky at
a meeting of the Non-Intervention Committee.
"Even if we assume that all the 6000 Germans are not part
of the regular German Army, can we even then consider
them as ordinary volunteers?.... In a country like Germany
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"this could only happen because the German Government knew
of, sympathised with, and supported with all the forces
of State power, the despatch of the 6000 troops in ques-
tion. " »•
On the 4th December 1936, the Governments of France
and Great Britain "having established the identity of their
views" on the Spanish Situation
"asked the German, Italian, Portuguese and Soviet Govern-
ments through their diplomatic representatives to those
Governments to join with them in declaring their absolute
determination to renounce strictly all direct or indirect
action which might in any way be calculated to lead to
foreign intervention in the conflict and as a consequence
to address to their representative on the London Committee
appropriate instructions with a view to the organization
of a fully effective control. Through the same channel,
they further asked the four Governments to join them
in a spirit of humanity in an endeavour to put an end to
the armed conflict in Spain by means of an offer of medi-
ation with the object of enabling Spain to give united
expression to its national will."!.
No greater success attended the Anglo-French attempt
of the 4th December to initiate negotiations for an Armistice.
The Soviet Government, who replied on the 9th December, de-
clared without reservation that they were ready to take part in
an attempt to bring the conflict to an end by mediation; but the
other three Governments, all of whom answered on the 12th Decem-
ber, made it clear that the proposal was doomed to failure.
Germany and Italy also offered to cooperate in examining propos-
als which other Governments thought likely to succeed, but
explained that for their own part they regarded a reconciliation
between the Nationalist Government in Spain and the "party in
opposition" as hardly conceivable.
The opposition to the idea of isolating the problem of
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volunteers and dealing with it as a matter of special urgency
was led by the Italian representative. Count Grandi, with active
support from his German and Portuguese colleagues and with the
object, it was generally assumed, of gaining time for the des-
patch to General Franco of further detachments of volunteers.
On the 24th December the French and British diplomatic repre-
sentatives in Berlin, Rome, Lisbon and Moscow were instructed
to impress upon the Governments to which they were accredited
the urgent need for putting an end to the despatch of volunteers
to Spain and to request them to take the necessary legislative
measures at the earliest possible moment. The Soviet Government
was again the first of the four Governments approached to reply
to the Anglo-French demarche, and again their reply was favora-
ble, They also emphasized that the agreement should be con-
cluded at the earliest possible date in order to preclude the
possibility of a great increase in the number of volunteers
while the negotiations were in progress. The Soviet Government 1
forebodings that the •Fascist* Powers would once more play for
time and use the interval to increase their assistance to Gen-
eral Franco were justified by the event. Neither Germany nor
Italy made any reply to the Anglo-French demarche for ten days
and the answers which they then gave were non-committal.
The German and Italian Governments were, however,
prepared to negotiate an agreement on volunteers on the under-
standing that "the solution of other questions connected with
indirect intervention would be taken in hand immediately."
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They also raised the question of the withdrawal of the volun-
teers who were already there - declaring that "the best solution
of the volunteer problem would. ... be achieved if it became
possible to remove from Spain all non-Spanish participants in
the struggle, including political agitators and propagandists,
so that the state of affairs of August 1936 would be restored."
It has already been mentioned that the French Govern-
ment had let the German Government know that they regarded the
influx of German troops in Spain and Spanish Morocco as a direct
threat to their security; and when Paris actually concentrated
French troops in the northern part of the French Morocco, it
was successful in creating the impression that France was pre-
pared to resist - if necessary by force - any further attempt
by Germany to establish herself in the Spanish Zone of Morocco.
There was a prompt response from Berlin. As a proof of their
good faith, the Spanish Moroccan authorities invited foreign
journalists to see the situation on first hand and verify for
themselves the absence of German troops there.
The British Government, in the meantime, suggested
that the prohibition of volunteers should be put into force in
advance of the establishment of a system of control. The French
Government, of course, agreed to it, but at the same time they
made a reservation by which they would regain their freedom of
action in respect of volunteers if an effective plan of control
was not put into force with general consent within a reasonable
time of the agreement on volunteers. The Italian and German
.. O law - ; -
. .
- .
[Bijr ' . 1 Od
.
...
•
• 8BXf
f
q
nty
{ .
-
: :> •.,! f f } A- ^
•
' Z
'
'
' 1
•
.
..... i
„
. t
'
'
... ..
1
" ' f
’
:;
.
.
O'.'
' XT c; JV.‘
:
' rl
.
‘-1 OV •
' don bb
»replies, which were again virtually identical in substance, de-
clared that the two Governments had already introduced the legist
lation necessary to enable them to prohibit the departure of
volunteers and that they were ready to put the measures in ques-
tion into force, simultaneously with the other Powers concerned,
as soon as "the general lines 'of an adequate system of control"
had "been agreed upon.
"
The detailed plan of supervision over traffic with
Spain by land and sea which had been worked out by the Chairman*
Sub-Committee of the Non-Intervention Committee with the assis-
tance of experts had in accordance with the Committee* s decision
of the 23rd December been sent to the Spanish Government and to
General Franco on the 1st January 1937, and by the last week of
January the replies from the two parties had made it clear that
there was no hope of putting the plan into force in its original
form.
s
Proposals for amending the plan of control and for
making it applicable to volunteers as well as to war material
were under consideration during January by technical experts
and by the Chairman* s Sub-Committee, and on the 28th January
the Sub-Committee reached agreement provisionally on a revised
plan providing for the supervision of the land frontiers of
Spain by observers stationed on the non-Spanish side of the
frontiers concerned, for the embarkation of observing officers
on ships of the participating countries bound for Spanish ports
and for the patrolling of the Spanish coast by warships belong-
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ing to the participating Powers. This plan for dividing the
responsibility for patrolling the coast of Spain between the
Powers was acceptable in its general lines to Germany and Italy,
and by the middle of February those Powers had come to the con-
clusion "that it was not worth their while to put any more
difficulties in the way of enforcing the agreement to prohibit
volunteers (partly, perhaps, as a result of further strong
representations from France on the subject of foreign expedi-
tionary forces in Spain; but also possibly because their joint
contribution to General Franco’s man-power had now reached a
level which should, in their view, give him a definite advantage
over his opponents; or because they anticipated that they would
be able without much difficulty to evade the obligation into
which they were about to enter, if the need for further rein-
forcements should arise)."
Approval was given by all to the general lines of the
new scheme of supervision, subject to the adjustment of certain
outstanding questions and it was decided that the prohibition
of the enlistment or despatch of volunteers to serve with eithei*
party to the Spanih conflict should come into force simultan
eously for all the countries at midnight on the 20th-21st
February 1937.
l
1. Survey of International Affairs, 1937, Vol.II, p. 288
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CHAPTER EIGHT
The System of Control
The difficulties which retarded the putting into oper-
ation of the scheme of control under the Non-Intervention Com-
mittee were partly technical and partly political. The most
serious political difficulties were raised by the attitude of
Portugal and Russia, The Portuguese Government refused to con-
sent to the internation supervision of their land frontier with
Spain; but the obstacle was later overcome when they consented
to a proposal by which an adequate number of British observers
would be attached to the British Embassy and consulates "to see
to the rigorous fulfilment of Portugal’s obligations." It was
also explained that while the observers would "be given all
facilities" they would not "possess the powers originally
suggested for the international controllers," nor would they
"be recognized as delegates of an international organization."
All the members except Russia were in favor of a pro-
posal by which the coasts of Spain would be divided into sectors
and a supervision of these sectors would be undertaken by the
fleets of Great Britain and France in respect of the coast un-
der the control of the Spanish Nationalists, and by the fleets
of Germany and Italy in respect of the coast under the Spanish
Government's control. In support of this plan it was urged that
the allocation of zones for supervision to a Power opposed to
the party in possession of the zone appeared "to present the
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best practicable method of ensuring an impartial application of
the scheme of observation. n
But Russia was still opposed to the plan as it stood,
since it gave her no share in the patrolling fleets. The ob-
jection was not overcome till at a meeting of the Chairman’s
Sub-Committee on the 26th February 1957 the Russian representa-
tive announced that his Government would waive their right to
be represented among the patrolling fleets and the Portuguese
delegate, simultaneously, withdrew his Government’s claim like-
wise. But there still remained difficulties of a financial
nature. The question of allocating the cost of the scheme of
control between the countries represented on the Non-Interna-
tional Agreement had been under consideration for several weeks
and by the middle of February the financial aspect of the scheme
had been approved in principle, though smaller nations continued
to default in the payment of their shares. The scheme of super-
vision which finally emerged from these prolonged deliberations
was a good deal more elaborate than the original plan. Respon-
sibility for the administration of the plan as a whole was to
rest with an International Board composed of representatives
nominated by the British, French, German, Italian and Soviet
Governments with a chairman appointed by the Non-Intervention
Committee.
"The maritime part of the scheme provided that all ships
bound for Spain which had the right to fly the flag of
participating countries should take on board at specified
ports and roadsteads observing officers whose duty it
would be to supervise the unloading of the ship's cargoes
at Spanih ports and verify that they did not carry war
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"materials or volunteers. It was estimated that a total
of 550 observing officers would be required to carry out
these functions. It would be the duty of the patrolling
fleets to report the arrival in their zones of any ships
which had not been notified to them as having complied
with the prescribed procedure, and to draw the attention
of the masters of such vessels to the obligation to sub-
mit to inspection which was imposed upon them by the laws
of their own country. The commanders of patrolling war-
ships were to have the right to verify the identity of
any ship proceeding from a port of any of the participating
countries or flying the flag of one of them, and might
order such ships to stop, bos.rd them and examine their
papers; but they were not to ha\e the right of search in
such cases and the only action which they could take would
be responsible for passing on the information to the Non-
Intervention Committee and to the Government of the country
whose flag the ship in question was flying. The patrolling
warships would carry out their duties only within a distance
of ten sea miles from any point on the Spanish coast.” 1*
The most serious loophole in the naval observation
scheme, however, was presented by the fact that it had been
found necessary to dispense with the cooperation of the two
Spanish parties to the war, so that ships flying the Spanish
flag would not be subjected to the procedure of observation.
There was also another class of ships which would not be sub-
ject to supervision - those flying the flags of non-European
States which were not members of the Non-Intervention Committee.
Thus, for instance, the delivery of war material from Mexico to
the Spanish Government would not be affected, so long as it was
carried in Spanish or in non-European ships.
On the 15th April, the Chairman* s Sub-Committee was
informed by the International Board that the second stage had
now almost been completed and that the scheme could be put into
operation at midnight on the 19th-20th April 1937. By the 30th
April the scheme was brought into full operation.
1. Survey of International Affairs, 1937, Vol.II, pp. 292-293
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CHAPTER NINE
Withdrawal of Volunteers from Spain
The German and Italian Governments had, as early as
7th January 1937, referred to the desirability of an arrangement
by which all the non-Spanish nationals serving on either side in
the Spanish war could be withdrawn, and in their notes of the
25th January they had again declared that "they were ready to
join in a discussion of this question by the Non-Intervention
Committee." On the 8th March, after the Non-Intervention Com-
mittee had expressed approval of the plan of control, it adopted
a resolution laying down the lines on which its future work was
to proceed, and the terms of this resolution indicated that the
’Fascist Powers* had won this preliminary round. It ran:
"The International Committee propose now to pursue the ex-
amination of the question of extending the Non-Interven-
tion Agreement to prohibit other forms of indirect inter-
vention including the grant to either party in Spain of
any form of financial aid and the entry into that country
of persons of non-Spanish nationality for any purpose
likely to prolong or embitter the present conflict. The
Committee propose also to consider whether, and if so in
what manner, it might be possible to arrange for the with-
drawal from Spain of all non-Spanish nationals engaged,
either directly or indirectly, in the present conflict in
that country."'*
But during this period occurred the Guadala jara*.
Guadalajara was a serious blow to Italian prestige and it was
followed by an immediate stiffening of the Italian Government*
s
attitude towards the withdrawal of volunteers. On the 23rd
March Count Grand! told his colleagues on the Chairman* s Sub-
committee that, in his opinion, the question of the withdrawal
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of volunteers was not a technical problem hut a general one.
In the course of the discussion which ensued, the Soviet Ambass-
ador pointed out that this attitude was in sharp contrast with
Italy* s previously declared policy in regard to foreign volun-
teers. Thereupon, Count Grand! said that it was his personal
hope that no Italian volunteer would leave Spain till the end
of the war* "The Italian volunteers," said Count Grand!, "will
not leave Spanish territory until General Franco has gained a
complete and final victory."
Senor Alvarez del Vayo records it thus:
"The London Committee, deeply impressed by the laudable
frankness of Italy* s distinguished representative,
entered this gallant statement, not without a certain
pride, in its minutes.
"
The Italian Government* s refusal to discuss the with-
drawal of volunteers, coupled with the Russian accusation against
Italy, had created a situation of extreme gravity to the break-
ing point of the Non-Intervention policy. On the subject of
Y"€.
the recall of volunteers, Italy*
s
Acalcitrance was waived by the
third week of April. Similarly, by this time French and British
influence had also induced Moscow to modify its attitude, and
M. Maisky had been persuaded not to persist in his demand that
a special commission should be sent to Spain to establish the
truth of the allegations regarding Italian intervention.
The special Sub-Committee on the withdrawal of volun-
teers submitted on the 26th May to the Non-Intervention Committee
a detailed report on the measures to be taken by Governments for
the recall of their nationals from Spain and on ways and means
1. Freedom* s Battle
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of effecting the withdrawal under adequate supervision. Before
the 21st May the British Government had "made confidential en-
quiries of the other principal Governments concerned to ascer-
tain whether those Governments would .join with them in an ap-
proach to both contending parties in Spain;" the objective of
which "would be strictly limited to asking them to agree to a
temporary cessation of hostilities on all Spanish fronts for a
period sufficient to enable the withdrawal of foreign nationals'*
to be arranged.
By the end of May four of the five Governments con-
cerned had complied with the British request for an esqaression
of an opinion on this question. The prospect for a successful
outcome of the British demarche on the subject of a truce was
therefore not good when, on the 28th of May, the question of
withdrawing volunteers from Spain formed one of the main topic
3
of discussion at a meeting of the LON council at Geneva. A few
days before the opening of the 97th session of the council on
the 24th May, the Spanish Government had asked that the situation
in Spain should be discussed. They also made a collection of
documents containing recent evidence of foreign intervention and
published them in the form of a White Book while the council was
in session. These documents, according to Senor Alvarez del Vay
proved "irrefutably" -
(1) The existence on Spanish territory of complete units
of the Italian Army, whose personnel, material, liaison
and command are Italians.
(2) The fact that these Italian military units behave in
the sectors assigned to them as a veritable army of
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occupation.
(3) The existence of services organized by the Italian
Government for these military units on Spanish terri-
tory as if they were in a finally conquered country.
(4) The active participation of the most eminent person-
alities in the Italian Government who have addressed
messages to the invading forces, giving them advice
and encouragement in their aggress ion. i.
Then Senor Alvarez del Vayo proceeded to deal at some
length with the irruption into a sovereign and independent
country of 70,000 or 80,000 Italians, but he laid even greater
stress on the bombing of Guernica, which as he remarked had
"lighted a salutary flame of indignation throughout the world."
But Messrs Delbos and Eden were concerned to prove despite the
Spanish Government’s contention to the contrary that there had
been an improvement in the situation since the previous Decem-
ber, "it would be impossible," declared Mr. Eden, "to deny that
real progress has been made since that date, and in these days,
when the possibilities of international collaboration are so
frequently denied, it is as well to recall this fact."
The Council, after debating the issue, adopted the
folloY/ing resolution:
"The Council expresses the firm hope that such action will
be taken in consequence of this initiative as may ensure
with the utmost speed the withdrawal from the struggle of
all the non-Spanish combatants participating therein;
this measure is at present, in the Council’s opinion, the
most effective remedy for a situation, the great gravity
of which, from the stand point of the general peace, it
feels bound to emphasize and the most certain means of
ensuring the full application of the policy of non-inter-
vention.
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CHAPTER TEN
Withdrawal of Germany and Italy from the Naval Patrol
During the earlier period of war, numerous cases of
interference with non-Spanish shipping by the Spanish combatants
were on record. But in the first five months of 1937 the mari-
time activities which caused most concern were those of the
Spanish Nationalists. The sufferers from General Franco 1 s in-
discriminate policy included Russian, French, British, Dutch
and Scandinavian ships. The situation in regard to British
shipping became still more acute early in April in consequence
of the Nationalists* attempt to blockade Bilbao. The decision
which the British Cabinet reached in these circumstances was
announced by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on
the 12th April:
"His Majesty 1 s Government cannot recognize or concede bel-
ligerent rights and they cannot tolerate any interference
with British shipping at sea. They are, however, warning
British shipping that in view of conditions at present
prevailing in the neighbourhood of Bilbao they should not
for practical reasons, and in view of risks against which
it is at present impossible to protect them, go into that
area so long as these conditions prevail." 1«
It was announced at the same time that the battle -cruiser Hood
had been sent to the north coast of Spain since it was "the
desire of H. M.'s Government that, having regard to the diffi-
cult position which had arisen in those waters, an adequate
naval force under the direct command of an officer of flag rank’
should "be available."
Meanwhile, other Governments beside s those of Britain
t.Tow&E-S, a|>
.
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and Prance were finding increasing cause for concern in the
molestation of their merchant ships in Spanish waters. But on
the 29th May occurred an incident which precipitated a crisis
of first rank. Aeroplanes, belonging to the Spanish Government,
bombed the German battleship Deutschland in the Mediterranean
with the result that some 30 German seamen lost their lives and
many more were injured. "The nature of the German reaction was
unprecedented. " The German Government took no action for thir-
ty-six hours after these events had occurred at iviza, but on
the morning of the 31st May, a German cruiser and four destroy-
ers fired 200 shots at the town of Almeira. Later on the same
day the German Government communicated to the Non-Intervention
Committee their version of the Deutschland incident and in-
formed them of the action which they had taken in retaliation
at Almeira. They added that "after the harbour works had been
destroyed and the hostile batteries silenced, the act of
retaliation was terminated."
At the same time the Non-Intervention Committee were
notified of the German Government's decision to "cease to take
part in the control scheme as well as in the discussions of the
Non-Intervention Committee, as long as they 'had* not received
sure guarantees against the recurrence ofsuch events." The Non-
Intervention Committee received notice on the same day from
Italy that she had decided to follow the example of Germany and
withdraw her ships from the patrol system and her representative
from the Committee "until such time as the Committee itself had
s
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adopted measures which would serve to prevent new criminal
attacks .
"
During the critical dayswhich followed the German and
Italian announcements of the withdrawal from the patrol system
and from the London Committee, the main concern of the British
and the French Governments was to avoid the breakdown of the
policy with which they had associated themselves. During the
next few days, accordingly, negotiations were opened through
FRANCE
diplomatic channels between the Freneh and Great Britain on the
one hand and Germany and Italy on the other, with the object of
finding as—to what guarantees would satisfy the ‘Axis 1 countries
%NX>
which would enable them to resume their duties in the non-inter-
vention scheme. On the evening of the 12th June, agreement was
reached in the form of two documents, in the first of these,
which was transmitted immediately to the Spanish Government and
to General Franco, the two parties in Spain were asked "to give
a specific assurance" that their naval and air forces would re-
spect foreign warships "on the high seas and elsewhere" and to
\
agree with the four Powers "on a list of Spanish ports to be
made available for use as bases for their patrol ships and on a
definition of the safety zones which should be established in
those ports."
/
In the second document, the four Powers undertook in
e
the event of a new incident, to "endeavor in every way to come
to a satisfactory agreement by conferring," but reserved their
attitudes in the event of a "new situation" having arisen becaus
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agreement had not been reached within a given period of time,
which should be in accordance with the circumstances of the
individual case." On the 16th June, the Governments of Germany
and Italy announced that they had decided to return to the Non-
Intervention Committee and to resume their duties in regard to
naval control immediately without waiting for the two parties in
Spain to give the assurances for which they had been asked.
But during this time another incident took place which,
changed the entire position. A German warship was again in-
volved and the German communique issued on the 19th June de-
scribed the attack on the cruiser Leipzig and added that the
German Government were not prepared "to look on at the target
practice of the Spanish Bolshevist submarine pirates until
eventually they may score a hit," and that it would be the
"task of the four Powers to undertake measures applicable in
the circumstances and in accordance with the agreement." The
German government proposed a joint naval demonstration, simul-
taneously with an enquiry into the circumstances of the alleged
attack and refused to accept the contention of the French and
British Governments that the enquiry must precede the joint
action. While the discussions had been going on in London, Herr
Hitler had remained in close touch with his principal advisers,
and the outcome of those deliberations in Berlin was awaited
with considerable trepidation in Paris and London. It was with
great relief that the French and British Governments learned
that the Fuhrer this time did not propose to stage a second Al-
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meira, but had decided to confine his action to withdrawing -
this time, definitively - from the naval patrol scheme; but
it was stated that they would still consider themselves bound
by the Non-Intervention Agreement and would continue to be
represented on the London Committee.
The decision of the Italian Government to withdraw
from the patrol scheme but not from the Non-Intervention
Committee was, as expected, announced on the same day.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
Withdrawing of Volunteers and Granting Belligerent Rlght3
After the withdrawal of Germany and Italy from the
naval patrol system the only outstanding questions discussed
during the two months following were the withdrawing of volun-
teers from Spain and granting belligerent rights to both par-
ticipants in the Spanish Civil War. Meanwhile, the French and
British Governments working in close collaboration worked out
proposals for reconstituting the naval observation scheme now
that the system of naval zones which had come into force in
April had broken down. On the 25th June, the two Governments
decided that they should take over the duty of patrolling the
German and Italian zones as well as the zones originally allo-
cated to them. The suggestion ran as follows - that
"the United Kingdom should be responsible for the naval
observation of those parts of the coast of Spain now in
the hands of the Spanish Government and that the French
and the United Kingdom Governments should share a respon-
sibility for the observation of those parts of the coast
of Spain now in the hands of General Franco on a basis to
be arranged between the two Governments, W1 *
The suggestion for posting observers on the ships en-
gaged in patrol was included in the Anglo-French proposals in
the hope of averting *Fascist* suspicions that the new arrange-
ment might operate less impartially than the old; but it did
not achieve its object. The German and Italian representatives
"pointed out their strong objections in principle against any
proposal which was not based on the necessary equilibrium so as
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to ensure absolute impartiality of control*" They notified the
Sub-Committee at the same time that their Governments "had de-
cided to advise their nationals at present employed as observing
officers under the observation scheme to resign their appoint-
ments. "
Since the Anglo-French Plan was not acceptable to
the ‘Axis* Powers, it was suggested that they should produce
counter-proposals for submission to the Sub-Committee. It was
not difficult to forecast that the idea of granting belligerent
rights would figure prominently in their plans, because it waa
generally assumed that the granting of belligerency to both
sides would be in the favour of General Franco*s side due to his
naval superiority. The plan which the German and Italian Gov-
ernments drew up in consultation was placed before the Chair-
man 1 s Sub-Committee on the 2nd July. It contained the following
"constructive suggestions."
(1) All interested Powers agree to grant to the two partied
in Spain belligerent rights. 1.
(2) With the exception of the patrol system, which as al-
ready pointed out, has proved an entire failure and
cannot therefore be continued, the present supervision
system already approved by the Committee should still
be maintained. The German and the Italian Governments
accordingly suggest that the observation of the land
frontiers of Spain, as well as the system of supervision
both in the ports and with the observers embarked on
board the ships flying the flag of the non-intervention
countries, should be maintained. 2-.
But the Italo-German proposals failed to get the
support of the majority opinion, and it was decided that the
German-Italian and the Anglo-French plans should be sent to all
1
.
T0jNfc££, 4- ^-^2,5".
X ,s * p .
.'
'
:
'
...
' op ' f E : U! 8*1
.
•
.
!
'
.
1 '• " : . :
'
'
>
'
'•
•••"•
;
’
v rfd &zf fcervlc B£ ' : icf , $ r : r :; roo . .. : <:;u ' ft
-
'
.
.
.
-
•• •-
;i . •.
r
..
'
..
3JSs . . :
.
.
-
...
r
101
the Governments represented on the Non-Intervention Committee
with a request for their views on the relative merits of the
two sets of proposals. One reason why the idea, which was tak-
ing shape during the first half of July, of conceding the recog-
nition of belligerent rights in consideration of the withdrawal
of volunteers commended itself to the British Government was
that the opposition of the 'Fascist' Powers and especially of
Italy to the proposal for the withdrawal of foreign nationals
from Spain appeared to be growing stronger at that time, and the
prospect of an agreement on the question seemed to be remote un-
less Germany and Italy could be made to feel that it was worth
their while to change their tune.
Many difficulties were pointed out by the 'Axis'
Press, which would be met in the execution of the proposed plan
for the withdrawal of the volunteers. According to the German
Press, it would be impossible to carry out an arrangement of
this kind in an impartial manner because the "Bolshevist hordes"
on the Spanish Government's side were not subject to discipline
in the same way as the "Fascist" volunteers and therefore could
not be recalled by their Governments; whereas Signor Mussolini
in an article in the Popolo d* Italia, developed the contradictory
argument that the volunteers on the Nationalists* side could not
be recalled by their Governments because they could only be dis-
missed by the Generalissimo under whom they had taken service.
The two opposing plans showed no signs of reconcilia-
tion till the Government of the United Kingdom was invited to
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present a new plan meeting the objections of both the plans.
The British Government presented a lengthy plan closing in the
loopholes in the control system which had been in operation
since April 1937. In regard to the withdrawal of foreign vol-
unteers the British plan proposed that the Non-Intervention
Committee should -
"pass a unanimous resolution in favour of the withdrawal
from Spain of all persons whose evacuation is recommended
in the report of the Technical Sub-Committee; that a
Commission should be sent to either party in Spain to
make arrangements for and to supervise the withdrawal of
the persons in question as soon as possible. "1.
The plan was designed to satisfy Germany and Italy by
accepting their suggestion for the abandonment of the naval
patrol scheme and for the recognition of belligerency; while it
attempted to make these proposals less unacceptable to France
and Russia by providing a substitute for the patrol ships in
the shape of observers at Spanish ports, by making the bellig-
erent rights which it was proposed to grant subject to strict
limitations and finally by interlocking recognition of bellig-
erency and withdrawal of volunteers.
While the reception of the British plan, particularly
by the ‘Fascist’ Powers, had on the whole been more favorable
than had been expected, past experience had indicated that the
line which Germany and Italy would most probably follow would
be that of accepting the proposals in principle and wrangling
over the details. The Fascist Powers found an opportunity for
the exercise of their favorite tactics in an accident of drafts^
manship. The order in which the various points were set out in
1
.
i . 332.-33 •
.3 < tJ a
-Oi; ' . n . ; r. vie on m. ,t- : f'a.td’Jt*:.: 9..;.'
.
.
'
-
'
‘
'
'
:
-
r
: > • J ’
.
-n.
•
.
- : •:
"
.
-
3
.
'
*
•
.
•
•
. ;
' '
.
,
••
’
.
•
'
‘
-
:
i
'
'O '.
. £
•3n.3 1 o iq nl ali 30(;c‘iq ©itf j oos lo arid v
.
f.
.
103
the text of the British proposals (which had been drawn up in
considerable haste) placed the question of granting belligerent
rights before the question of withdrawing volunteers, end al-
though this order was reversed in the last section of the plan,
this discrepancy offered scope for limitless arguments on pro-
cedure.
The Italian Ambassador insisted that his Government
had accepted the British plan on the understanding that the
various points would be followed as given in the plan; the re-
establishment of control over land frontiers should therefore in
his view be considered before the withdrawal of volunteers. The
meeting, as a result of fruitless discussion, was adjourned with-
out arriving at any conclusions.
The German and Italian Governments later changed their
ground a little and suggested that recognition of belligerent
rights and withdrawal of volunteers ought to take place simulta-
neously. The French Government accepted the plan in the entirety
but subject to the principle that the recognition of belligerent
rights should not be accorded until there had been "substantial
progress" in the withdrawal of volunteers. it was the Soviet
Government’s viewpoint that they in no circumstances would
agree to the grant of belligerent powers to the Nationalists;
but added that they "might" revise their plans when "all" vol-
unteers had left Spain - and they also reverted to their earlier
contention that General Franco’s Moroccan troops be counted as
foreign troops. But what was "substantial progress" to mean?
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Substantial progress might be made to mean anything according
as to who was interpreting it. But the phrase at least could
hardly be taken to mean that the process of withdrawal must be
completed before the recognition of belligerency could even be
considered. The deadlock appeared to be complete and it was
expected that the best solution to it was to hope that time and
continued diplomatic pressure would produce a change of policy.
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« CHAPTER TWELVE
‘Piracy* in the Mediterranean and the Nyon Agreements
The early days of August saw the beginning of a new
phase when indiscriminate attacks upon merchant ships were let
loose in the Mediterranean. The attacks took place without
warning or enquiry and without regard to the nationality of the
vessel attacked, the nature of its cargo, or its port of desti-
nation. Moreover, this campaign of ‘piracy* was conducted not
only by aircraft and surface warships but also - and this to an
increasing extent as the month went on - by submarines, whose
identity it was much more difficult to establish. In the period
between 5th August - 15th August, ten ships were attacked.
By this time the indignation and anxiety of the coun-
tries whose ships were being attacked reached a pitch at which
it was felt that some kind of collective action was called for
in addition to the steps which were already being taken by the
individual Governments in the defence of their own interests.
Before the end of August the French and British Governments had
entered into consultation with a view to dealing with the menace
The aircraft which attacked ships of various nationalities
during August were known or presumed to belong to the National-
ists; but the submarines whose attacks were proving so damaging
the recognition of their identity was a much more difficult task
In a communique issued on the 18th August, the Spanish
Government openly accused the Italian Government of responsibili
*
.
ty.
•
.
' 1
•
’
•
-
.
t :rcf 80 2i£8*ii- v ' 0 J.'iue. m/s tlav&il-i '€ r *?0
- no dr
.
.
.
•
''
dj rlodtq b 5 'floe©i frjj/jsdd. ; :£9tf eidw eq/cjrfe ee©xi o '>£•:$
; llfi 919V
,
.
.
•
.
fr. } ) ; . £
r.'. j
’
•
-n
1
'
/ ;t
•' / o. ' j
;
r
: r« f t • ri •/ o:
106
declaring that the attacks on Spanish merchant ships were
carried out by Italian submarines and destroyers. Rome indig-
nantly denied any charges of piracy and pointed to Russia as
the "villain of the peace." But it was hard to believe how
Russian submarines would have attacked the Spanish and Russian
merchant ships which figured prominently in the casualty list.
One possible theoretical explanation was that tv/o pirates of
different ’ideological' complexions were at work at the same
time; "that assumption might incriminate Russia without ab-
solving Italy." In fact, for some weeks past the Italian Press
had been boasting openly on Italy’s refusal to be neutral in
the Spanish war and recalling the glorious way in which the
Italian legionaries were acquitting themselves in Spain. In a
speech at Palermo on the 20th August, Signor Mussolini declared
once more, in categorical terms, that Italy would not tolerate
the establishment in the Mediterranean of "Bolshevism or any-
thing of a similar nature." Again, while visiting Berlin, Sig-
nor Mussolini declared before an audience of 600,000 people
that
"Fascism has fought with words and with weapons. When
words are not enough and if circumstances require it,
then it is the weapons that speak. This is what we have
done in Spain. "
But the recall of these facts hardly helped to stop
the campaign of piracy. So, the Governments of Britain and
France after a series of conversations agreed that the best way
to curb this lawless campaign was to hold a special conference
of the States principally interested and not in bringing it be-
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fore the Non-Intervention Committee - the members of which had
learned by bitter experience that it was impossible to arrive
at any conclusions with despatch even on the problems requiring
most urgent attention. It was also agreed that the meeting
place should not be Geneva; and Nyon was finally chosen. On
the 6th September joint Anglo-French invitations to attend a
conference at Nyon on the 10th September in order "to end the
present state of insecurity in the Mediterranean and to ensure
that the rules of international law regarding shipping at sea
shall be strictly enforced" were issued to ten countries -
Germany, Italy, Greece, Jugoslavia, Turkey, Egypt, Albania, the
U.S.S.R., Rumania and Bulgaria.
At this stage the Soviet Government "took a hand in
the game." She suspected (and this undoubtedly with reason)
that if Germany and Italy were represented at Nyon, one of the
objects of taking the discussion of the submarine menace away
from the Non-Intervention Committee would be defeated; for the
tFascist 1 Powers would certainly not neglect the opportunity of
arguing that the recognition of belligerent rights would be the
surest and quickest method of bringing the pirates to book.
The Soviet Government therefore did their best to ensure that
the Italian and German Governments should not accept the invi-
tation to the Nyon Conference. On the 6th September, simultan-
eously with the delivery of the French-British invitation, a
Russian note was handed to the Italian Foreign Minister alleging
that Italian submarines had been responsible for the sinking of
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two Russian merchant ships on the 30th August and the 1st
September respectively and demanding compensation and the pun-
ishment of the guilty persons. The Russian move achieved its
object. On the 9th September both German and Italian Govern-
ments notified the French and British Governments that they had
decided not to send representatives to Nyon. But the meeting
was held in spite of their absence and nine States were represented.
The Conference conducted its affairs with despatch
and efficiency, and a statement was issued to the press on the
11th September summarising the provisions of the Nyon Agreement,
The Agreement provided measures for collective action -
for the protection of non-Spanish merchant ships whereby the
principal trade routes in the Mediterranean were to be patrolled
(French and British warships were to be responsible for the
patrol on the high seas and the lesser Mediterranean States
were to be responsible only in their own territorial waters)
and any submarine found in suspicious circumstances was to be
attacked. wptfj chslkeri out.
The British and French fleets were still further
augmented and on the 16th September the Chairman of the Non-
Intervention Committee was formally notified that the two
Governments had decided to use the ships which had hitherto
been engaged in patrolling the coast of Spain under the obser-
vation scheme. The patrol scheme, therefore, came to an end on
the 17th September, though the system of embarking observers on
ships bound for Spain remained in force. On the 17th September
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a supplementary agreement was signed extending the arrangements
so as to cover protection against piratical attacks by aircraft
or surface vessels*
The 'Axis' countries had expected that in their ab-
sence the Nyon Conference would not be held or if held at all
would not at any rate take any momentous decisions. So they
were much chagrined to watch the results of the Conference.
The Governments of Great Britain and France, realising the un-
comfortable position of Italy especially, attempted to give her
a sRave* by inviting her to take part in the anti-piracy patrol.
Italy, smarting under the unexpected course of the Nyon Confer-
ence, first rejected the minor role offered to her; but
negotiations were later opened on the basis of equal Italian
participation with the two other patrolling Powers and these
negotiations were successfully concluded in Paris on the 30th
September 1937, and Italian participation in the arrangements
became effective on the 13th November, and the 'piracy' also
stopped simultaneously. Mr. Churchill pointed out in an un-
forgettable speech that
"Never since the days of Caesar had the fiat of Rome
more instantly pacified the Mediterranean. "
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN
)
*
Discussion of the Spanish Question by the League of Nations
In a telegram which was despatched on the 21st August
to Geneva, the Spanish Government appealed to the Council, under
Article 11 of the Covenant, to examine without delay the situ-
ation in which Spanish merchant ships were suffering "criminal
and repeated aggressions at the hands of the Italian Navy.
But during this time the Spanish Government found fresh cause
for protest in the fact that they were not among the Govern-
ments which were invited to send representatives to the Nyon
Conference. The fact was that if Valencia was invited, Burgos
ov<y.
could hardly be left ovor. So the Nyon Conference had delib-
erately excluded the question of attacks upon Spanish shipping
in the Mediterranean.
Senor Negrin, the head of the Spanish Republican
Government, protested against the omission of Spain from the
States to be represented at Nyon and announced his intention of
raising at the meeting of the League Council the question of
the extension of any arrangements which might be made at Nyon
to Spanish shipping. He urged on the 16th September that the
distinction between legal and illegal attacks ought to be
abolished and that all shipping in the Mediterranean, Spanish
and non-Spanish alike, ought to be given the benefit of col-
lective protection against any hostile action by submarines.
surface vessels or aircrafts. Senor Negrin also appealed to
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the other members of the council to abandon "fiction and make-
believe" and to recognise that the attacks on merchant shipping
in the Mediterranean were not a natural phenomen the causes of
which could not be discovered but were the work of Italian war-
ships. The resolution which the Council finally adopted on the
4th October did not deal with the protection of Spanish shipping
and did not even meet the Spanish Government’s criticism that
the Nyon arrangement appeared to sanction the continuance of
attacks upon merchant shipping which were not of a piratical
na ture
.
Meanwhile the question of the attitude of the League
of Nations towards Spain was again reopened. Senor Negrin
denounced the action of the Fascist Powers and the failure of
the policy of non-intervention in much the same terms as Senor
Alvarez del Vayo had employed at Geneva four months earlier.
Only M. Litvinov and the representative of Mexico came out
openly in support of the Spanish Government. But it was signif-
icant that the speeches of the statesmen who had been the prin-
cipal advocates of that policy struck a note of doubt as to the
possibility of maintaining it which had not been heard in the
earlier debates on the Spanish question at Geneva. The policy
of non-intervention, said M. Delbos,
"is possible only if it is observed by all, with effective
supervision and particularly if there is unanimous and
sincere acceptance of a common law requiring in particular
that each country should withdraw those of its nationals
who are taking part in the Civil War." 1 -
Mr. Eden, who addressed the Assembly on the 20th
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*
September, said,
"if Non-Intervention now has to be discarded, it will not
be for lack of patience on the part of its original spon-
sors. Let us not, however, conceal from ourselves this
patent fact; if the policy of non-intervention is aban-
doned, Europe will be swept into deeper and more dangerous
waters. A leaky dam may yet serve its purpose. ” >•
No better example can be found of lingering hope than
Mr. Eden’s hope of yet retrieving the issue through his "leaky
dam." But the situation was becoming alarming to the French
Government, and they appeared to have intimated at this time to
Great Britain that unless the situation changed rapidly it would
not be possible for them, in the interests of French security,
to avoid a decision to throw open the Franc o-Spanish frontier
for the transport of men and munitions to the Spanish Republicans
in order to counter-balance the activities of the 'Fascist*
Powers in Spain.
Meanwhile, Italy assured both France and Great Britain
"that Italy had no intention of making the smallest change in
the territorial status of Spain; that she had no designs upon
the Balearic Islands and that the integrity of the continental
and insular territory of Spain would be strictly respected."
The official position in both capitals, Paris and
London, after these assurances was that until such time as
*
Rome should give notice of the annexation of these islands,
there need be no occasion for anxiety. Senor Alvarez del Vayo'
comment is worth noting.
"One of the phenomena of modern international politics is
that words mean more than deeds, however much living
reality may prove them false. Territories can be annexed
,-
• ai • 2
.
: :
.
.
;
;
.
j
•
:
-
.
.•
.
u •
'
-
.
• C
.j • : • V
.
.
;*’* r '
- :•
.
. oJtrcaoX
'
' '
' :•
•
. o i \ ' . \: :•
t no
t
:
,
.r; ;r r ! - n
o £ • "/
t
i
:
•
.
J
' Ci '
113
I
"countries invaded, but until the aggressor considers that
the moment has come to give official notice to the chan-
cellories, it would seem to the democratic governments
and their diplomats to be a sign of bad form, incompatible
with their high office, to question the correctness and
disinterestedness of such proceedings. Members of the
opposition, with their incurable vulgarity may well con-
cede some importance to the physical presence of a few
thousand Italians in the Balearic Islands, but among
educated people what matters is not what is done but
what is promised
"The British Prime Minister was always of this opinion,
and in his speech in the House of Commons on November 2,
1938, he stated that at Munich he had spoken on the sub-
ject of the future of Spain with Herr Hitler and Signor
Mussolini and that both of them had assured him ’most
definitely* that they had no territorial ambitions what-
ever in that country.
"....Therein lies the mistake - the mistake of not realizing
that it was never a question of territorial ambitions or
annexation of the Balearic or any other part of Spain, but
of bringing Spain under the influence of Axis policy in
such a way that results are obtained without the necessity
of creating a second Fascist Chamber in Majorca, flying
the Italian f ag over Port Mahon, or appointing in the
Canary Islands a German protector of the same standing as
Baron von Neurath in Bohemia. Time and again I explained
to the representatives of Great Britain and France how
well we knew that neither Hitler nor Mussolini would be
so irresponsible as to risk unnecessarily their comfortable
and certain position in Spain for senseless territorial
ambitions and that for those with any memory of inter-
national affairs a zone of influence was the same thing
as open annexation with all the advantages of the annexa-
tion and none of its risks." 1*
But it was in the discussions of the Sixth Committee
that the real conflict of wills was fought out, with the French
and British representatives as the protagonists on one side and
the Spanish and Russian representatives on the other. Alvarez
del Vayo was bitter and wanted Senor Negrin’ s five points to be
incorporated in the resolution. But by continuous pressure
Senor Alvarez del Vayo had to abandon his position and the final
1. Freedom*
s
Battle, p. 105.
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draft said,
"that not merely has the London Non-Intervention Committee
failed, despite the efforts of the majority of its member
of which the Assembly expresses its appreciation, to se-
cure the withdrawal of non-Spanish combatants taking part
in the struggle in Spain, but that it must today be
recognized that there are veritable foreign army corps
on Spanish soil, which represents foreign intervention
in Spanish affairs.”'
The resolution after expressing further pious hopes
for withdrawal of foreign troops, etc., noted,
”if such a result cannot be obtained in the near future
the Members of the League which are parties to the Non-
Intervention Agreement will consider ending the policy of
Non-Intervention, ” *-•
Naturally enough, the passages in the resolution
which gave the greatest satisfaction to the Spanish delegation
and induced them to accept this half loaf with a good grace
were also those to which the strongest exception was taken by
certain other delegates.
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN
Withdrawing Volunteers and Granting Belligerent Rlghts-Again
Signor Mussolini told an audience of more than
600,000 people in Berlin on the 28th September that the commu-
nity of ideas between Germany and Italy had "found expression
in the struggle against Bolshevism." Fascism had "fought with
the utmost energy this form of human degeneracy" and it was in
order "to save European culture" from Bolshevism that "thousands
of Italian Fascist volunteers had fallen in Spain." This
reference to Spain in Mussolini’s speeches showed it more clear-
ly than ever that no change in Italian policy vis-a-vis Spain
should be expected in the near future.
Since the Non-Intervention Committee was scarcely
getting anywhere, the British and French Government tried to
start on tripartite discussions with Italy. On the 2nd October
a joint Anglo-French note was presented in Rome inviting the
Italian Government to examine with Great Britain and France "in
a spirit of perfect frankness the situation arising from the
prolongation of the Spanish conflict." Although it was practi-
cally a foregone conclusion that this invitation would be re-
fused, it was not until the 10th October that the Italian Gov-
ernment informed the French and British Governments that in
their opinion a discussion of the situation in Spain carried
on in the absence of other states who were directly interested
' would lack the elements indispensable for reaching an agreement'
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and that It was therefore preferable that "the question of
non-intervention should continue to be dealt with at the London
Committee." They also took the opportunity to declare categor-
ically that they would not "participate in conversations, meetings
or conferences to which the German Government had not been
formally invited.
"
On the 18th October the Italian Government semi-
officially announced in Home that the correct figures of the
Italian forces in Spain were 40,000 and not 100,000 as reported
in foreign press at that time. A few days later, the Italian
diplomatic representatives in London and Paris were instructed
to convey this information officially to the Governments to
which they were accredited. Meanwhile, the French Government
after communicating with the British Government had decided to
postpone once again the decision regarding the opening of the
Franco-Spanish frontier and to accept the Italian Governments
proposal that the problem of the withdrawal of the volunteers
should be referred back to the Non-Intervention Committee.
But on the 15th October, Mr. Eden tried to take a
little stiffer line and said that their agreement to hand the
question back to the Non-Intervention Committee did not mean
that they were "prepared to acquiesce in dilatory tactics." In
the existing conditions of "proclaimed intervention the
glorification of breaches of agreement," the patience of those
who had "striven to keep their responsibilities towards Europe
constantly before them" was "well nigh exhausted," and in his
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view, a "nation, which if such conditions continue, felt com-
pelled to resume its freedom of action" would not be open to
criticism. At the meeting of the Sub-Committee on the 16th
October, the French representative^. Corbin, took Mr. Aden's
line and declared that his Government could not allow the pres-
ent situation to continue and that they would "consider them-
selves entitled to reserve their full liberty of action" if
the Committee did not come to an agreement at the earliest
possible moment.
The new points in M. Corbin's suggestion were that
Governments should be asked to renew their formal pledge not
to despatch volunteers and aircraft to Spain; that there should
be an immediate "token" withdrawal of a certain number of volun-
teers and that the international Commissions which were to super
vise the withdrawal of volunteers should be nominated as the
authority which would decide at what stage belligerent rights
could be granted. At the second of this series of meetings of
the Chairman's Sub-Committee, on the 19th October, Italy and
Germany showed a marked preference for going back to the British
proposals of the 14th July. M. Corbin readily agreed to let the
Fascist Powers have their way rather than afford them an
opportunity for further delays over procedure.
At the meeting of the Chairman's Sub-Committee on
the 20th October, Count Grandi announced that Italy was now
prepared to agree that international commissions should be sent
to the two parties in Spain without delay. The result of their
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investigations would "make it possible to decide in what manner
and in what proportions" the withdrawal of foreign nationals
should take place; and Italy agreed that the decision "at what
moment and in what manner belligerent right should be recognised"
should be postponed until the Non-Intervention Committee had
at its disposal the reports of the commissions. This declaration,
with which the German representative associated himself, was
followed on the 22nd October by an explicit statement from
Count Grand! that his Government now accepted completely the
nine points of the British plan of the 18th July. Perhaps, the
Axis Powers realised, that they had stretched the democracies
to the snapping point and a little loosening would not be out
of place.
But while the Axis Powers had expressed their consent
to participate in the Conference, the Soviet Union* s persistent
refusal to accept the compromise linking up a withdrawal of
volunteers and the granting of belligerent rights was proving
the most serious obstacle. The Soviet Government's delegate,
however, notified the Chairman’s Sub-Committee that his govern-
ment had consented to abstain from voting, instead of casting
an adverse vote. On the 2nd November the Chairman's Sub-
committee was able to agree upon the text of two resolutions for
submission to the full Committee and laying down the program
to be followed in putting the plan into effect.
The resolutions authorized the Chairman of the Non-
Intervention Committee to approach the two parties in Spain
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*
immediately with a view to securing their cooperation in "the
withdrawal, under international supervision, of all persons
engaged in the present conflict who are of non-Spanish nation-
ality or who were of non-Spanish nationality at its outbreak
in July 1936." The resolutions were adopted on the 4th Novem-
ber by the full. Non-Intervention Committee. Count Grandi,
however, emphasized that
"Tt must be clearly understood that the acceptance of the
British plan by the Italian Government has been and still
remains conditional to the unreserved acceptance by all
the 27 member States of the British plan itself.
As for M. Maisky, he defended once again his Govern-
ment's standpoint on belligerent rights, but he indicated that
there was a possibility that they might modify their attitude
if they were convinced that the other provisions of the British
plan were being carried out in good faith.
In accordance with the terms of the first resolution
of the 4th November, Lord Plymouth had invited the Spanish Gov-
ernment and the Nationalist regime at Salamanaca to inform him
without delay whether they were prepared to cooperate in the
manner indicated in the resolution in the withdrawal of volun-
teers. General Franco accepted in principle the proposal sub-
ject to certain reservations regarding the terms of reference
and composition of the commission, etc. General Franco also
suggested that the recognition of belligerent rights might take
place when 3,000 foreign nationals had been withdrawn from
either side - an interpretation of "substantial progress" in
withdrawal,
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The reply of the Republican Government also accepted
the proposal but inquired whether their definitive acceptance
of the plan would involve recognition of the Nationalists'
belligerent rights, A meeting of the Chairman's Sub-Cbmmittee
on the 7th December took note of the replies from the two par-
ties in Spain and agreed that it would now be possible to take
more definite steps towards the organization of the Commission
which were to be sent to Spain, But there still were terms,
which required agreement, for instance, on the question of
what interpretation, in actual figures, was to be given to the
term "substantial progress" etc. Anyway, the Secretary of the
International Board was authorized from the 1st January 1938
to make a beginning with an investigation of the administrative
problem involved in the plan for withdrawing.
It was proposed by experts that the withdrawal of
volunteers from either side should be proportional to the total
number of foreign combatants in the service of either side.
Italy hastened to raise objection to this interpretation of the
"substantial progress" clause. While the difficulty of making
any authoritative estimate of the actual numbers of foreigners
in the service of either side, at any rate until the inter-
national commissions had completed their first task of counting
heads, was recognised in official quarters in London, it was
also recognized that the Spanish Republican Government and
their Russian supporters in the Non-Intervention Committee -
who had consistently maintained that the number of foreigners
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on the Nationalist side would be found to exceed that on the
Republican side and who also believed with good reason that the
grant of belligerent rights would favor the Nationalists -
were not likely to agree with the view of General Franco and
his backers that "substantial progress" would have been achieved
when an equal number of "volunteers" had been withdrawn from
either side.
On the 10th February the situation took a new turn,
when the Italian Government notified the British Government of
their desire to open conversations for a settlement of all
outstanding Anglo-Italian differences, including the question of
the recognition of Italian sovereignty over Abyssinia as well
as the reconciliation of British and Italian interests in the
Mediterranean. Italy also showed another gesture by accepting
the proportionate principle and diplomatic conversations in
London during the last week of February revealed that all the
principal interested Powers except the U.S.S.R. were prepared
to agree to the figure of 10,000 as the initial figure to be
withdrawn from the side which possessed the smaller total number
of foreigners. The resolution of the 4th November 1937 had
provided that,
"as from a date to be determined by the Non-Intervention
Committee and which should shortly precede the commence-
ment of the withdrawal of non-Spanih nationals from Spain,
observation on the Franco -Spanish and Portuguese -Spanish
frontiers should be restored and strengthened simultaneous
iy with the adoption of measures to strengthen the sea-
observation scheme. "b
When the Chairman's Sub-Committee attempted to deter-
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mine the date for the restoration of control, the Italian
representative with German support, urged that international
supervision of the Franco-Spanish frontier, which had been sus-
pended since the 13th July 1937, should be restored simultan-
eously with the arrival in Spain of the International Commission
which were to count the foreign combatants and arrange for their
withdrawal. The French Government, on the other hand, inter-
preted the terms of the resolution of the 4th November in the
sense that the restoration of control ought not to take place
until the preliminary arrangements for withdrawing the volun-
teers had been completed, and the actual evacuation was about
to begin.
s
In the middle of March, Senor Negrin, the head of the
Spanife Republican Government, flew to Paris in order to appeal
for French help in countering the Nationalist offensive. When
the French Government in July 1937 had suspended the facilities
for observation to international observers which they had
accorded three months earlier, they had announced that a
supervision over traffic with Spain would continue to be exer-
cised by the French customs officials; but the Nationalists
claimed that they had definite proof of the passage of war
material through the Franco-Spanish frontier. In any case,
there seems to be little doubt that in March 1938 instructions
for a relaxation of the control were issued to custom officials
and that for some three months thereafter a substantial amount
of munitions from Russia A France had been passing through the
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frontier. According to a statement which was broadcast by
M. Flandin on the 2lst June 1938, M. Blum who had formed his
^ second administration on the 13th March authorised the trans-
port of war material to Spain on the 17th and 25,000 tons of
such materials crossed the frontier during April and May.
"ThatFrance should thus take a leaf out of the Fascist
book was a new turn in the Spanish affair that aroused
great resentment in Italy, and her annoyance was increased
by the fact that it was difficult for her to retort in
kind by augmenting her own assistance to General Franco
while the Anglo-Italian conversations were in progress
in view of the fact that Mr. Chamberlain had impressed
upon the Italian Ambassador, at the outset, the importance
which he attached to Italy* s abstention from any rein-
forcement of Spanish Nationalist strength calculated to
effect a material alteration in the situation. "!•
The protocol which was signed on the 16th April be-
tween Italy and England - amongst other things, Italy assured
Great Britain that she had no territorial or political aims and
undertook that, "if the evacuation of non-Spanish nationals had
not been completed at the end of Spanish war, all remaining
Italian nationals would leave Spanish territory forthwith and
all Italian war material would likewise be withdrawn." On the
4th May the French Ambassador in London informed Lord Plymouth
that his Government accented a proposal for restoring super-
vision over the land frontiers of Spain as soon as the inter-
national commissions began their task of counting the "volun-
teers" on the understanding that the French Government should
regain their freedom of action if the evacuation of "volunteers'
was not actually in progress at the expiration of a definite
time limit.
In the second week of May, the League Council was
1, Survey of International Affairs, 1938, Vol. I, P. 316
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called upon to consider yet another protest from the Spanish
Republican Government against the intervention of Italy and
Germany. The French Government, again, aligned themselves with
the British Government in support of non-intervention. Senor
Alvarez del Vayo opened his attack on non-intervention on the
11th May and made a fervent plea that the Spanish Government
should have their right to buy war material from other coun-
tries restored to them. But as on previous occasions it had
little effect on the guardians of international law, and Lord
Halifax upheld non-intervention as the only practical policy.
On the 26th May, the Soviet Government made one con-
cession on their nrevious stand by agreeing to accept the initial
figure of 10,000 "volunteers' 1 to be withdrawn from the side
which was to have the smaller total number. He opposed the
adoption of a formula which was otherwise generally acceptable
regarding the method of classifying the "volunteers” and he
also objected to the proposed revision of the maritime obser-
vation scheme on the ground that it would not be really effective
But later Russia withdrew this objection also and accepted the
conclusions arrived at by the Council.
Meanwhile, Rome was becoming more and more impatient
at the delay in the coming into force of the Anglo-Italian
Agreement, which would give Italy the Sovereign position in
Abyssinia. In Italian eyes the blame for a state of affairs in
which the coming into force of the agreement seemed likely to
be indefinitely postponed rested principally upon the French
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Government due to their having allowed the passage of war
material to which they attributed the Republican^ ability to
check what appeared to be the final offensive by General franco.
Franco-Italian conversations made little progress,
however, and they were suspended completely after Signor
Mussolini had publicly declared in a speech at Genoa on the
14th May, that in the matter of Spain "France and Italy were
on the opposite sides of the barricades." London had been
looking with disapproval upon the opening of the Franco -Spanish
frontier for the transport of munitions. Meanwhile, the
situation in Europe was becoming sombre and Paris did not want
to lose the assurance of support from England at such a
critical time. Since the Franco-Spanish frontier had not been
officially declared open, there was no official announcement
regarding its closing; but by the middle of June it had be-
come known that the transport of war material across the
frontier was no longer permitted on the scale that had been
attained during the recent weeks. Once again the Fascist
Government had succeeded in imposing its will upon the »e4;-
democracies
.
The desire of the Italian Government that the date
of ratification should be as early as possible was, the British
declared, fully reciprocated by them; but Lord Perth could not
give any assurance to Rome if thespanish settlement, which the
British Government had made a condition precedent to the
ratification of the agreement, wou] d be considered to have been
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achieved until the Italian "volunteers" or a substantial pro-
portion of them had been withdrawn from Spain. By this time
it was clear that General Franco could no longer be expected
to win an outright victory in the field in the immediate future,
and the topics touched upon during the Anglo-Italian conversa-
tions in Rome were reported to have included the possibility of
arranging a truce between the Spanish combatants. It was felt
that war weariness might be expected to be making itself felt
among the civil population in Nationalist as well as in Repub-
lican territory, and it was believed that influences in favor
of a compromise solution were now making themselves felt on
both sides.
*
At the beginning of June the question whether the
time was ripe for an offer of mediation was understood to be
under consideration between Paris and London. This question re-
ceived an apparently definite reply in the negative when the
Spanish Nationalists announced on the 4th June that only Tin-
conditional surrender from the Republican forces would end the
war, and the Spanish Republicans retorted a few days later by
the statement (which was issued by Senor Alvarez del Vayo at
Geneva) that there could be no mediation between the Spanish
nation and invaders.
It emerged from the Anglo-Italian conversations that
had been going on that the coming into force of the agreement
of the 16th April must remain dependent upon the application of
the British plan for withdrawing volunteers from Spain and that
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if Italian Government desired despatch it behoved them to coop-
erate to the full both on the efforts which were being made in
London to secure general agreement on the British plan and in
the carrying out of the arrangements contemplated.
There was another difficulty in the way of the working
of the "withdrawal policy." The Soviet Government’s persistence
in their refusal to contribute towards the maintenance of the
"volunteers" in Spain after their withdrawal from the field was
disposed of on the 28th June by an undertaking on the part of
the four other Great Powers to share the cost between them. On
the 5th July the full Non-Intervention Committee adopted the
plan unanimously after some three hours’ discussion. But the
plan, adopted on the 5th July, was never put into force as the
subsequent events will show. The plan - contemplated a period
of 45 days from "zero date" (the date on which the plan, having
been accepted by the two parties in Spain, would be declared by
the Non-Intervention Committee to be in force ) - was to be
allowed for two commissions to go respectively to Nationalist
and to Republican Spain, count the "volunteers" and report to
the Non-Intervention Committee; and then the Non-Intervention
Board was to bring into existence the machinery required to
carry through the operation of withdrawal; the actual process
of evacuation was to begin on the 46th day and be completed by
the 150th day from "zero date."
Thus the process of evacuating foreigners was esti-
mated to take nearly six months even in the improbable event of
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no delays and difficulties occurring to hinder the smooth work-
ing of the scheme; and since the consent of the two parties in
Spain had also to he obtained before "zero date" could be de-
clared, it was evident that, at the best, the process could not
be completed until after the turn of the year. it was not in-
tended, however, that the grant of belligerent rights to the
two parties in Spain should be postponed for as long as six
months. The plan laid it down explicitly that "substantial
progress" justifying the recognition of belligerent rights
would be achieved as soon as 10,000 volunteers had been evacu-
ated from the party which the international commissions found
4
to have the smaller total number and a corresponding higher
number from the other side.
The adoption of the resolution of the 5th July 1938
was greeted in London with great rejoicing. The plan was com-
municated to the Governments at Barcelona and at Burgo^or
their approval on the 6th July with the request that they shoulc
treat the matter as one of great urgency. The Republican Gov-
ernment handed a formal notification at the R> reign Office in
London and the reply was considered to be satisfactory. But
it was not until the 16th August that the Nationalist Adminis-
tration sent their reply. Moreover, the reply was "very far"
from satisfactory.
The Burgos Government was prepared to agree that
10,000 volunteers should be evacuated immediately; but they
stipulated that that number should be withdrawn simultaneously
i *xefc a i oi ; o'x ' c !>•£ ' 1 8
,
.
- ri ft br: Oi 'COO '•&& *i c.
o . p; 1 't •' cfru fn /
8561 ttIj/O itf 3 1*3 1o noictjr o :e- siict ‘to toi.rU c.
.
•
"
.
»
.
*
O'
"
«
129
from both sides. Moreover they made it clear that they would
agree to the withdrawal of 10,000 volunteers only on the basis
of the prior recognition of their belligerency to which they
considered themselves "entitled as a right and not as a part
of a bargain. " it also said that there could be no cessation
of hostilities while the count was going on. The delay and the
uncompromising nature of the reply when it was finally delivered
were all the more significant because at this time a fresh
series of reports regarding an increase in the scale of Italian
intervention in Spain were under investigation.
On enquiry by the British embassy, the Italian Foreign
Minister appears not to have denied the allegations and indeed
to have declared that Italy could not remain inactive in view
of the renewal of French intervention. Count Ciano seems, how-
ever, to have declared that any supplies that were being sent
were only the replacements which were required to keep the
present Italian force in the field and to have given an assur-
ance that his Government were ready for their part to carry out
the plan for the withdrawal of volunteers under proper guaran-
tees.
By this time, however, the Czechoslovakian crisis had
assumed proportions which overshadowed every other international
problem. It was agreed in the informal conversations conducted
by Lord Plymouth that no purpose would be served by summoning
a meeting of the Non-Intervention Committee or its Sub-Committee
in order to discuss the Nationalists* terms. Instead, the st*s-
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gestion was made that Mr. Francis Hemming, the Secretary of the
Committee might go to Spain in order to discuss the situation
with General Franco at first hand and endeavour to remove his
objections to the Non-Intervention Committee’s plans. The
Soviet Government, however, were against even this concession
to the Fascist point of view. But Mr. Hemming and a small staff
arrived in Burgos on the 11th October,
Meanwhile, however, the entire situation in regard to
"volunteers” in Spain had changed. At the session of the League
Assembly on the 21st September, Senor Negrin had announced the
Spanish Republican Government’s decision to part immediately
with all the non-Spanish nationals serving in their ranks, and
he had asked that the League Council should appoint a Commission
to supervise the evacuation and to see that it was carried to
completion. The prime motive for this unilateral decision on
the part of the Republican Government was no doubt the belief
that it would strengthen their claim to have their right to buy
war material in any market restored to them. After a "little
of the usual billeting," a Commission was constituted, and it
arrived at Barcelona on the 17th October.
But the official Nationalist attitude was still that
no possibility of a compromise solution eould be considered.
Nevertheless, there appeared to be some evidence that resentment
in certain Nationalists’ circles against foreign arrogance was
working in the direction of reconciliation with their fellow
Spa.niai ds in the opposite camp. It is possiole this movement
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helped to Influence General Franco in making up his mind to
part with a certain number of his Italian auxiliaries
. It was
agreed between Rome and Burgos that about 10,000 of the Italian
legionaries who had been serving in Spain without intermission
for 18 months should return to Italy in the hope that this ges-
ture would induce the democratic Powers to grant belligerent
rights without delay.
The fact that General Franco had announced to the
press at Burgos on the 27th September, when the European crisis
was at its most acute point, that he would remain neutral in
case of European complications had confirmed the belief which
had always been held in official circles in Great Britain that
there was little reason to fear the maintenance of Italian and
German influence over Nationalist Spain when the war had ended.
Signor Mussolini duly received his reward on the 2nd November
when the House of Commons at Westminster decided by 385 to 138
votes to empower the Government to bring the agreement with
Italy into force immediately.
The Commission, in the meantime, supervised the
evacuation of troops on both sides and left Spain on the 23rd
January 1939 and established itself at Perpignan, where it was
engaged for nearly 4 weeks in preparing its final report for
the Council of the League of Nations. By the time the Commissio
left Spain the Republican resistance in Catalonia was rapidly
giving way and in the chaotic conditions which subsisted during
the last ten days of January 1939 it was not possible to carry
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»out arrangement for evacuating any more of the members of the
International Brigades from Spain.
It has already been noted that the decision of the
Spanish Republican Government to part with their foreign aux-
iliaries had been taken independently and not in application of
the plan which had been submitted to them by the Non-Interventio
Committee. But the visit of the Secretary of the Commission to
Nationalist territory had not made General Franco any more
willing to accept the terms which had been put before him in
the previous July.
Mr. Chamberlain tried to sound a different note
before his forthcoming visit to Rome:
"So long as there are foreign troops in Spain and so long
as no other solution has been found for the Spanish ques-
tion but that which is involved in the Non-Intervention
Plan, the Government do not propose to grant belligerent
rights to the parties in Spain other than in accordance
with the Non-Intervention Plan Itself. " '•
But the rapid advance of Nationalist had changed the
situation entirely, and the question now shifted from the with-
drawal of volunteers during the war to the question whether
those auxiliaries would leave Spain as soon as the Nationalists
had completed their conquest of Republican territory. The re-
affirmation by Signor Mussolini of his promises to seek no
special advantages in Spain and not to maintain his armed forces
in that country after the termination of the war appears to
have satisfied the British Ministers that changes to British
disadvantage in the Mediterranean need not be feared as a
consequence of General Franco’s victory, and their conviction
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on this point played an important part in determining the lines
of French as well as British policy during the next few weeks.
As the Republican resistance was giving way, there
were demonstrations and a fresh renewal of activity on the part
of the opposition. During a debate on foreign affairs on the
31st January, Mr. Chamberlain was able to point out with' perfect
truth that intervention in behalf of the Republicans would now
have to be on a very considerable scale if it was to effect the
issue and in reaffirming his faith in the rightness of the
policy which H. M. Government were following, Mr. Chamberlain
expressed in strong terms his belief that a reversal of the
policy of Non-Intervention at this stage "must inevitably lead
to the extension of the conflict in Europe."
But it was in France, where real anxiety was felt on
the consequences of having an unfriendly neighbour just across
the border. It was, therefore, not out of question that the
French Government might decide to make a last moment attempt
to prevent a Republican collapse by allowing munitions to cross
the frontier in sufficient quantities to equalise the strength
of the two parties in armaments; or they might decide to occupy
themselves some parts of Spanish territory of strategic im-
portance to their defense. But in the end, it was decided that
the risks of standing passively by and watching the Nationalists
establish themselves in control of the whole of Catalonia were
less serious than the risk of taking action in the face of the
expressed determination of Germany and Italy to counter any
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measures of assistance which might be given to the Republicans
and of the manifest unwillingness of the British Government to
support France in any direct intervention on behalf of the
Spanish Republicans.
Senor Alvarez del Vayo was again sent by the Republi-
can Government to Paris in a last minute desperate attempt in
the third week of January 1939 to see if the French Government
could be persuaded to "rectify the error" which had brought
the Republic to this stage. But Paris had already decided. So
there was nothing to do any more. To quote Senor Alvarez del
Vayo:
"The civilian evacuation of Barcelona began while I was
making a last moment effort in Paris. All we asked was
what one might term a loan of arms to be returned within
a month or six weeks. It was impossible to obtain it.
Yet in Paris everybody had suddenly become aware of the
tremendous error committed in regard to Spain. Henri de
Kerillis, who is one of the most intelligent exponents of
French nationalism, but who had nevertheless, in his own
vigorous fashion, upheld the cause of the rebels through-
out the war, wrote that at such a time a Franco victory
•was a catastrophe for France.’ Army generals, members
of the Daladier Government begged me to assure them that
Barcelona would hold out for at least another couple of
months, since in a very short time there would be a change
in the whole European position. Noble sentiments, a per-
fect understanding of the situation, but no effective
assistance. The French Government had once again
been paralysed by London. Mr. Chamberlain had just re-
turned from Italy and the totalitarian tactics of con-
fronting the Western democracies with a fait accompli had
succeeded again all along the line. A few days before,
I had had a talk with Lord Halifax in Geneva. I had then
gathered the impression that when in the Rome conversa-
tions the Spanish problem was mentioned, Mussolini, with
a comment worthy of his realistic policy, had cut short
the feeble attempts of his distinguished British guest to
draw his attention to the ill effects produced on British
public opinion by the decisive participation of Italian
divisions in the Catalan offensive. ’That matter,’ said
the Duce, ’has already been settled. Franco has won and
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"» there is no point in pursuing the question further.*"
Thus, after thirty one months* bitter civil war, the
Spanish Government faced by overwhelming odds, opposed by the
dictatorships and betrayed by its own friends, had to give up
the struggle. The last ogvernment broadcast said, "if lose we
must, we should do it honourably." But the end was bitter. It
was difficult to believe that after such a glorious exhibition
of courage and loyalty the end should be this. And while the
Republican forces were hurrying across the Pyrenees into France
in those desolate nights. General Franco was celebrating his
victory, accompanied, appropriately enough, by the chiming of
the Church bells. Hardly ever had the Church bells sounded
more dismal. But they did peel for a number of days.
To come to the Non-Intervention Committee again,
neither the Committee nor its Sub-Committee had held any meeting
since the beginning of July 1938 when they had adopted the plan
for withdrawing "volunteers" from Spain. When the Secretary
of the Committee, Mr. Hemming, had failed to persuade General
Franco, there was little else for the Committee to do at the
time. But although its activity was completely suspended during
the last phase of the war, it was not formally dissolved until
after the war was at an end. The Soviet Government decided to
withdraw their representative from the 1st March "for the in-
contestably sound reason that the Committee had long ago ceased
functioning.
"
"The Non-Intervention Board, however, continued to carry on
its work, and the system of maritime observation was main-
s
1. Freedom* s Battle, pp. 278-79
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"tained in force during the last stage of the struggle;
for, although it could not be claimed that the system was
achieving its purpose of preventing the transport of
munitions by sea to Spain, it was felt that its existence
did cause the intervening Powers to exercise a certain
restraint. On the 7th March, when the end of the war was
expected at any time, it was announced in the House of
Commons at Westminster that in view of the military
situation it was considered possible gradually to reduce
the scale of the observing staff, and that a considerable
number of the officers who had been engaged to supervise
the land frontiers had already been dismissed. About a
fortnight later the German and Italian Governments in-
formed the Non-Intervention Board of their decision not
to make any further payments towards the cost of the
scheme, and in these circumstances the Secretary of the
Board announced on the 22nd March that he would proceed
at once to dismiss all the observers and wind up the
Board* s affairs. The last formality took place on the
20th April, three weeks after the Spanish war had been
officially proclaimed at an end, when the Non-Intervention
Committee held a final meeting in order to dissolve
itself." 1 .
1. Survey of International Affairs
, 1938, Vol I, pp. 340-41.
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INTROSPECT
"T 1. tm7~ Zmmm 0
After following the course of the Civil war for 31
months, now comes the time for a little pause and heart search-
ing. What were the foul intentions of the two combatants?
Was General Franco sincere when time and again he reiterated
the interests of Spain at his heart or were they just a series
of the conjurer’s rabbits which came out of his hat at con-
venient times. And how about the part played by Italy and
Germany? And England and France? Was the Non-Intervention
Policy synonymous with betrayal as its opponents charged or
was it a genuine policy framed with all the good intentions
in the world but which failed due to the "wickedness" of some
of its members. Before attempting to answer them, it is as
well to recognize the fact that no definite answers can be
given to such questions, for the intangibles of politics never
admit of exact measurements. And it is always Very difficult
to say as to whaj should have happened, "if" the course of
events had taken this turn rather than that. Lastly most of
the arguments are inspired less by the strictly dialectical
position than by the emotional enthusiasm.
The years of 1935-36 were the years when the dsmo-
cracies were still reeling from the blows of the economic de-
pression and complete recovery seemed remote. The internal
conditions were chaotic and party-strife and factionalism were
the notes of the day. They were torn between contending
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loyalties and would have drifted to normalcy if time and
Mr, Adolf Hitler had the patience to wait. On the other hand,
the dictatorships were in the ascendency, and the entire
populations of these countries worked as single units and the
disharmony and party-strife were entirely absent from Italy
and Germany, These were, then, the conditions of the countries
which counted on the political arena of Europe. It was during
this period that the civil war broke out in Spain. It has al-
ready been stressed that the factors which produced the civil
war were almost entirely Spanish in charcter, but once the
conditions were ripe for such a development, the control of the
events passed in the hands of interested foreigners, on the
Nationalists side almost completely.
On the side of the Spanish Republicans, the only
country which followed a consistent policy of help was U.S.S. R.
and it is not incorrect to say that in the later stages of the
war, the Communists came to have a much stronger hold on the
policies of the government than their strength warranted.
According to Salvador de Madariaga, the Russians in Spain came
to wield such a strong influence that to some of their decisions
even the Senior G0vernment officers were not admitted. The
tank and air-craft services were kept under separate control
by the Russians, to such an extent that secret airfield existed
which were unknown even to the Spanish General Staff, to the
Army Commanders in whose territory the airfields were establish*
ed and to the War Secretary who happened then to be Prime
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Minister as well. Comrade Marcel Rosenberg who represented
Soviet Union in Spain, attended the Council of Ministers
and"meddled" in Spanish affairs, with the authority of the
man who delivers the goods. But Senor Caballero, the then
Prime Minister was not the kind of person to allow himself to
be driven by anyone, for he himself was used to drive others,
T 0 quote Salvador de Madariaga;
"Every effort was made at the time to bring largo
Caballero under the fold of the Muscovite Orthodoxy -
T not excluding a (Red) Papal Brief. On December 21st,
1936, P0ope Stalin and two of his Cardinals, Molotov
and VorAshilov, wrote to Comrade Largo Caballero a
letter brought from Moscow by Comrade Rosenberg in
which promises and advice were skilfully blended
with discreet warnings." 1 *
By this it should not be understood that the Spanish
Government was a £ool of Moscow in the sense that the National-
ists were in the hands of Rome and Berlin. In spite of all the
obligations which the Republic owed to Moscow for helping them
in their hour of danger, it must be said to the credit of the
Government that they continued to stand An their own feet as
much as any other nation could have been expected to do under
similar circumstances.
The beginning of the Non-Intervention Policy, in spite
of all its inconsistencies, was not the tragedy that it is made
out to be. It would have worked up if Great Britain and Prance
could have realized early enough as to whom they were matched
against. But this was not to be. Even up to the end, the
democracies never measured up to the task they had undertaken.
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And how could they. For Munich had still not taken place.
And the same Mr. Chamberlain was at the head of the British
Government who was to negotiate the "Munich Agreement" later
and was to come home happy by bringing "peace here and now".
No single reason can be given which will explain the failure
of the Non-Intervention Policy. It was a whole complex
situation, in which the weakness, the bickerings of the placid
democracies were as much responsible for the ultimate tragedy
as the cunningne^s of the new Machiavellis of the 20th century.
The dictatorships continued to violate all the
Agreements of which they we re participants with an impunity
that was as ill-becoming to them as it was disgraceful to the
democracies. War-materials and munitions continued to pass
under the very noses of the British and French, which they
continued to watch helplessly. To quote Alvarez del Vayo;
"The transport of these men to Spanish territory cannot
have passed unnoticed by those Governments, which, in
adopting a policy that, despite its name, was merely
one of unilateral intervention directed against
Republican Spain, had assumed resp onsibilitjr for
fettering a country fighting for its independence.
No one, least of all, Berlin and Home, can seriously
believe that the British and French intelligence
services could have suffered over a period of weeks
from such a bad attack of mental aberration as to have
overlooked the dispatch from Italian territory of one
hundred thousand fully equipped soldiers - the figure
i& Italy's own, proclaimed by Forze Armate on June 8,
1939 after the war was over or that the consular
agents of both countries in the ports oft departure and
arrival could have confused troopships with Italian
tourists vessels calling at Cadiz and Malaga on a
pleasure cruise."
Again,
"Non-Intervention became one of the greatest farces cf
1. Freedom's Battle. Page 48
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our time - The long and brilliant repertoire of Italian
comedy has no better spectacle to offer than this, where
the debatable qualities of Lord Plymouth as stage-
manager served as a foil to the dexterity and abandon
of the actors. The most intelligent review of the comedy
was given in Stampa on July 20, 1937, in a single phrase-
a model of simplicity and of honest and impartial
dramatic criticism. HVhil^ the diplomats play for time,
the legionaries cut the Guardian knot with their swords."*
Though the part played by Berlin was not as noisy
as that by Rome, still it did not lack in effectiveness. The
Kolnische Zeitung of May 31, 1939 explained the difference of
tactics
.
"in contrast to Italy which during the war left nobody
in doubt as to the part played by her legionaries,
Germany awaited a Franco victory and the end of her
self-imposed tasks before disclosing all that the
German legion, which under the name of the Condor
Legion, enjoyed a high reputation in Spain, had
performed We have intervened from the first
moment to the last." 1 -
Herr Von Rauschning, in an article in Foreign
Affairs, his eyes opened by years of association with the
Fuhrer said, "In essence the war was being fought all along.
It was stupid then to try to prevent its breaking out." But
the suicidal attitude of the democracies still remains a
puzzle, to the students of international relations. The
Nazi Professor Max Grouen in a lecture given in constnace on
February 6, 1938, defined the Spanish war as a "European war
for Supremacy in the Mediterranean". Commander Berkeu, in the
March 1937 issue of Wissen un Wehr
,
one of the foremost
politico-military reviews of the Third Reich, wrote: "If
events in Spain go in favour of the Nationalists, and the
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Social-Communist regime has to yield to an authoritarian
regime on national lines, France will see on her southern
frontier, which until now has always been free from compli-
cations, the rise of a State which will oppose her policy just
as G ermany and Italy have done."
1.
In the October 1938 issue
of the same review, Dr. Herman Gackeriholz expressed himself
i
even more clearly.
"Because of the Civil War, Spain has become the central
point in the tension existing between the great
Powers. As this tension moves tov/ards the Western
Mediterranean, Spain 1 s importance as a potential ally
becomes greater than ever. To this cause more than
any other must be attributed the intervention of
Certain Foreign Powers.
Then, how is one to explain the policy of London
and Paris? In London, more than in Paris, there were many
supporters of the theory that once the rebel generals were
in power, it would not be difficult to win their favour, either
through financial interests, or by diplomatic negotiations
which would help them to shake off the "protection" of their
former allies. This conception of France as a "prisoner" of
Germany and Italy to be liberated at all costs - however
grotesque it may appear today was widely held in British
political circles by men who were sincerely convinced of the
truth. Consider Senor Alvarez del Vayo f s impassioned requests,
"We were not crying for the moon. We made no request
for ammed resistance. We only asked that in strict
accordance with the policy of Non-Intervention -
which Gr eat Britain and France had imposed on us and
should for that very reason have enforced - Spain
should be left to the Spaniards and that if those
two democracies did not feel able to prevent Germany
). Vft'jD, oJ>- cxfc, | oi.
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and Italy from continuing to intervene in Spain, they
should make honourable recognition 6f the failure of
their policy and reestablish in full the right to
freedom of trade. In a word we asked that inter-
national law should be respected."
) .....The way in which the British and French Govern-
ments ignored our warnings, suggestions and requests
was truly heart-breaking. At one point I began to
wonder whether those among us were not right who held
that this inconceivable apathy was due to the composition
of the Spanish Government, and whether a Cabinet ex-
cluding members of the extreme Lef-particularly the
Communists - would not be welcomed with more sympathy
and understanding in London and Paris. The Annexation
of Austria and the development of the Czechoslovakian
crisis, however, convinced me that the Anglo-French
lack of interest in the fate of the Republic had wider
causes. The policy of peace at any price, a policy
which must inevitably lead to war, had so-demoralized
the Western democracies that even the sacrifice of
their most important positions seemed justified of the
hunger of the totalitarian states could be momentarily
appeased thereby." 1 .
If the Western Democracies were so demoralized, the
League of Nations, was in no better position . In September
1936*, collective security was given an ignoble burial, when
the Spanish question was excluded from the deliberations of
the LON. Never had a league Assembly been subjected to a
greater humiliation than when the one vital question, on
whose solution depended the future of peace, was excluded
from its considerations.
"While the hand of war was knocking on the portals, the
representatives of nearly fifty countries - seated in
,
the resplendent armchairs of the new and luxurious
Conference Hall, which under the artistic direction
of M. Aveijol had been converted into a mortuary
-
^
—chamber^ silently swallowed their indignation at
) being made the laughing-stock of the whole world."
2
.
Democracy, Spanish democracy, did not fail in Spain
during the war. T?nr>npftflP anrl hn .<a PTf arvh
1. Freedom’s Battle, Page 239.
2. Freedom’s Battle. 14 a
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was European and to a certain extent American democracy that
failed in Spain and failed lamentably.
The reason generally advanced by the protagonists of
the Non-Intervention Policy is that it saved the world from
conflagration. For Professor Norman J. Padelford of the
Fletcher School, Non-Intervention was justified historically
for that reason. He writes,
"If the devices have not succeeded altogether in
stopping the entrance of supplies and men into
Spain; if they have glossed or provided a screen
behind which violations of pledged undertakings
have occurred; if they have become popular
laughing stock and have allowed unfortunate Spain
to become a military laboratory for the testing
of weapons and strategy, they have nevertheless,
been instrumental, with other things perhaps in
averting an extension of hostilities to other
territories .
"
But it was, perhaps this fallacy of thinking which
imagined that there were only two alternatives surrender and
war, from which the democracies had to make a choice, which
was responsible for the whole tragedy of Spanish Civil War,
The Spanish Munich was as unnecessary as the other.
"The Spanish Munich did not assume the theatrical form
of the celebrated conference in the birthplace of
National Socialism (the choice of which, as meeting
place, must have given Chamberlain and Daladier food
for thought)
,
but the principle of capitulations
was the same. The London Committee was the equi-
valent of Munich. It was the finest example of the
art of handing victims over to the aggressor states
while preserving the perfect manners of a gentleman
and at the same time giving the impression that
peace is the one objective and consideration. 11 1.
But there is a thing like nature and that it has
1. Freedom’s Battleq? Page 266.
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some rules. The past mistakes have a strange habit of
revenging themselves. It was French diplomacy, which re-
vived the formula so aptly defined by Talleyrand - a
century ago:" Non-Intervention? Between ourselves, its the
same thing as profitable intervention - but profitable only
for the other side,” And vindiction was complete, when in
1940, France lay at the feet of Adolf Hitler, moaning and
helpless.
But how can all the criticism in the world, of
this policy or that country, compensate for the grievous
wrong done to the Spanish Republic - for its innumerable
hours of anguish and tears. And worse still, the Republic
stands even today exiled and begging for justice and London
is again playing the same role. M. Blum, who was the
Premier of France in those fateful and faithless days,
admitted in his recent visit to New York that Non-Intervention
was the gravest error of his life. Meanwhile the exiled
Republic ie languish
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